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ARTICLES

Human Dignity in the Line of Fire:
The Application
of International
Human Rights Law During Armed
Conflict,
Occupation,
and
Peace
Operations
John Cerone*

ABSTRACT

One of the most controversialand politically charged issues
in current human rights discourse is whether and to what extent
states are bound by human rights obligations with respect to the
conduct of their armed forces abroad in armed conflict,
occupation, and peace operations. Underlying the controversy
are a number of complex legal questions, several of which have
eluded definitive resolution. Chief among these questions is
whether individuals affected by the conflict are among those
whose rights states are obliged to secure. Answering these
questions is further complicated in situations of collective
action, giving rise to such questions as whether national
contingents of multilateral operations retain their status as
organs of their respective sending states. The purpose of this
Article is to outline the issues underlying these questions and to
provide a framework for answering them.

* Professor John Cerone is Director of the Center for International Law & Policy at
New England School of Law. He has worked for international organizations in a
number of conflict and post-conflict environments, including Kosovo, East Timor,
Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone.
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Despite continuing objections on the part of a handful of
states, a consensus is evolving in favor of the view that human
rights law applies in full alongside humanitarian law during
times of armed conflict and occupation. While it is easy to see
how human rights law would apply to a state's regularforces in
a situation of internal armed conflict, the situation becomes
more complex when states operate abroad, especially when
acting through the context of collective action or with the
assistanceof private actors.
Human rights law, embedded in the inter-statestructure of
the internationallegal system, generally binds states and states
alone. At the same time, states are abstract entities, incapable
of acting as such. The conduct of states is the conduct of
individuals whose acts or omissions are attributableto the state.
Thus, the question of attribution not infrequently arises in
disputes before human rights bodies.
The legal standards for attribution of the conduct of nonstate actors to the state require a fairly high level of state
involvement or, alternatively, de facto state action by non-state
actors accompanied by state authorization or disengagement.
However, special rules may be evolving through the practice of
universal and regional human rights mechanisms. These
institutions have increasingly found degrees of state
involvement not rising to the level established for attribution
under the Articles on State Responsibility to be sufficient to
render the state responsiblefor the acts of non-state actors.
The question of attribution is separate in principlefrom the
content of international obligations. However, this distinction
may become difficult to discern in the context of a failure of a
state to fulfill positive obligations in relation to the acts of nonstate actors. The state is essentially in a constant state of
omission. However, in order for an omission to constitute a basis
of responsibility, there must be a duty to act. The question of
establishing a duty to act will turn on the content of the relevant
primary rule. Thus, in these circumstances, the issue of
attributioncollapses into the content of the primary rule.
The distinction between attribution of the conduct of nonstate actors and a state's responsibility for its omissions in
relation to the conduct of non-state actors has special
significance in the context of human rights law. Where human
rights violative conduct is attributableto a state, the state will
have breached an obligation, and responsibility will arise
immediately. Where such conduct is not attributableto a state,
the question of whether human rights law has been violated will
be determined by the quality of the state's response to this
conduct, generally governed by a "best efforts" standard.
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Most of the jurisprudence of human rights bodies, which
have greatly elaborated on the content of states' obligations
under the various human rights treaties, has been developed in
the context of alleged violations committed on the territory of the
respective state party. Can these same standards be transposed
onto the state's conduct abroad?In an effort to bring order to an
otherwise chaotic array of judicial (and quasi-judicial)
decisions, the Article provides a framework for delineating the
scope of human rights obligations by examining three different
parameters: the scope of beneficiaries, the range of rights
applicable, and the level of obligation. Structuring an analysis
of currentjurisprudence around these three parameters reveals
a trend toward recognizing varying levels of obligation. In
particular,it may be that negative obligations apply whenever a
state acts extraterritorially(at least with respect to intentional
human rights violations, as opposed to indirect consequences),
but that the degree of positive obligations will be dependent
upon the type and degree of control (or power or authority)
exercised by the state. This approach would preserve the
integrity of the respective treaties and would vindicate the
universal nature of human rights, which is proclaimed in the
preambles of all of the human rights treaties considered in this
analysis.
International judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have
provided answers to many of the important legal questions
described in the Introduction. Nonetheless, there remain
significant gaps that provide ample opportunity for these
institutions to further elaborate on what is required of states in
situationsof armed conflict and occupation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In a February 2006 report, five U.N.-appointed human rights
experts denounced the U.S. government for human rights violations
committed against individuals detained at Guantinamo Bay. 1 These
experts found that the nature and conditions of this detention regime
gave rise to numerous violations of the International Covenant on

1.
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Situation of detainees at Guantinamo Bay, Report of the Chairperson of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Ms. Leila Zerrougui; the Special Rapporteur on
the independence of judges and lawyers, Mr. Leandro Despouy; the Special Rapporteur
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr.
Manfred Nowak; the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ms. Asma
Jahangir and the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Mr. Paul Hunt, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/120 (2006).
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
2
Punishment.
In its reply, the U.S. government "profoundly object[ed] to the
Report both in terms of process and of substance," citing "numerous
glaring legal errors." 3 In its opinion, "[t]he Report's improper
conflation of the law of war (also known as international
humanitarian law) and international human rights law is a
fundamental flaw that undercuts virtually all of the Report's
conclusions."4 In particular, the United States expressly rejected the
application of the ICCPR to the detainees at Guantdnamo Bay,
asserting that their treatment was governed instead by humanitarian
5
law and relevant provisions of domestic U.S. law.
Whether and to what extent states are bound by human rights
obligations with respect to the conduct of their armed forces abroad in
armed conflict, occupation, and peace operations is one of the most
controversial and politically charged issues in current human rights
discourse. In the modern world, states are capable of mobilizing
massive destructive power across the globe with increasing speed and
efficiency. A crucial consequence of this enhanced military power is
the increasing breadth of states' impact on the enjoyment of human
rights in territories far beyond their physical frontiers.
In addition to traditional situations of armed conflict, individuals
today may find themselves in the power of states in fairly complex
configurations. States are increasingly operating through multilateral
frameworks, e.g., through coalitions or under the auspices of United
Nations (U.N.) or regional peace-keeping operations with increasingly
expansive mandates. Further, states are now purporting to create
zones beyond the reach of their human rights obligations. Detention
facilities at Guantanamo Bay, on the high seas, and in secret
locations raise controversial questions as to the nature and purpose of
human rights norms. Indeed, efforts by powerful states to withdraw
their military conduct from the purview of international law threaten
to undermine hard-won victories achieved by the international
human rights movement during the past sixty years.

2.
Id. at pp. 36-38.
3
Reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Report of
the Five UNCHR Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, March
10, 2006, at 1, 10.
4.
Id. at p. 11.
5.
"[Tlhe law of armed conflict provides the rules governing detention and
treatment of enemy combatants in armed conflict, and the ICCPR by its terms applies
only within the territory of the State Party." Id. At 16.
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Whether such conduct is beyond the reach of the relevant states'
obligations under international human rights law6 is a question very
much alive before international courts and human rights
mechanisms. Increasing numbers of cases involving alleged human
rights violations committed in conflict situations outside the physical
territory of the state are being adjudicated in various international
fora.
These institutions have already developed a varied
jurisprudence, accepting extraterritorial application of human rights
norms to the different scenarios to differing degrees.
Underlying the controversy are a number of complex legal
questions, several of which have eluded definitive resolution. Chief
among these questions is whether individuals affected by the conflict
are among those whose rights states are obliged to secure. A common
7
feature of human rights treaties is that the scope of beneficiaries
(i.e., those whose rights the state is obliged to respect and ensure) is
typically limited to those within a state's territory or subject to its
jurisdiction. 8 Based purely on an ordinary meaning interpretation of
the text, it is unclear how this would apply with respect to individuals
outside of a state's territory.
Even if a juridical basis for
extraterritorial application is established, the question of positive
obligations must still be resolved.
Answering these questions is further complicated in situations of
collective action, giving rise to such questions as whether national
contingents of multilateral operations retain their status as organs of
their respective sending states. The purpose of this Article is to
outline the issues underlying these questions and to provide a

6.
This refers to international human rights law in the strict sense (i.e., not
including humanitarian law and international criminal law). The present analysis will
focus on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and their
regional counterparts. Reference will also be made to relevant customary human rights
law.
7.
Use of the term "beneficiaries" is not intended to imply that individual
human beings are not rights-holders under human rights law.
8.
American Convention on Human Rights 'Tact of San Jose, Costa Rica" art. 1,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, entered into force July 18, 1978 [hereinafter ACHR],
available at httpJ/www.oas.org/juridico/englishr/reaties/b-32.htm; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950,
Europ. T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter European Convention], available at http://conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/en Treaties[Html/005.htm. While Article 2 of the ICCPR refers to all
individuals within a state's territory and subject to its jurisdiction, the Human Rights
Committee has interpreted these to be independent grounds for application of the
Covenant. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee
Under Article 5, Paragraph4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 52/1979,
12.1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/c/13/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981).
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framework for answering them. Part II examines the relationship
between human rights law and international humanitarian law. Part
III explores the nature of human rights obligations and the various
modes of state responsibility in relation to human rights violative
conduct. Part IV delineates a framework for understanding the
application of human rights law in relation to individuals outside of a
state's territory.
Part V concludes the analysis by discussing
implications of the present legal framework and suggesting principles
to guide future jurisprudential development.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT
AND OCCUPATION

Human rights law and humanitarian law (i.e., the law of armed
conflict) are separate bodies of international law with distinct modes
of application. While human rights law is primarily concerned with
the way a state treats those within its domain, "[h]umanitarian law
aims at placing restraints on the conduct of warfare so as to diminish
its effects on the victims of the hostilities." 9 For much of the
twentieth century, it remained unclear whether human rights law
would apply to a state's conduct during armed conflict or occupation,
with some states having taken the position that these situations were
governed by the lex specialis of humanitarian law, to the exclusion of
human rights law. Others took the position that human rights law
applied in full alongside humanitarian law. In support of their
position, they noted that the ICCPR and regional human rights
treaties contain provisions permitting derogation from certain
obligations in times "of public emergency which threatens the life of
the nation," the inclusion of which implicitly recognizes that human
rights law applies to all situations, subject to possible derogation with
respect to certain obligations. 10
Despite continuing objections on the part of a handful of states, a
consensus is evolving in favor of this latter view. As stated by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, "The Court
observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil

9.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment,
470 (Feb. 22, 2001). Other distinctions between human rights and
humanitarian law include the subjects of obligations, the institutions competent to
determine violations, the period of application, the scope of beneficiaries, the locus of
application, the range of rights protected, and the sources of obligations.
10.
ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 4. While states may derogate from certain
human rights obligations when faced with a public emergency, strict limitations apply.
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and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by
operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may
be derogated from in a time of national emergency."" This position is
shared by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) 12 and the Human Rights Committee 13 and has been echoed
in political fora as well. 14 As the ICJ clarified in a subsequent
opinion, "there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be
exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of
both these branches of international law."'15
In situations where these branches of international law overlap,
the ICJ, 16 the IACHR, 17 and the Human Rights Committee' 8 have all
concluded that the application of human rights law in times of armed
conflict or occupation must be informed by the standards of
humanitarian law. Thus, after noting that the "right not arbitrarily to
be deprived of one's life" is non-derogable, the ICJ explained:
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed
conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant,
can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 19

Once it is settled that human rights law does not cease to apply by
reason of the inception of a state of armed conflict, it is easy to see
how this body of law would apply to a state's regular forces in a

11.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1995
I.C.J. 95, 25 (July 8) [hereinafter Legality of the Threat].
12.
See Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
109/99,
39 (1999) [hereinafter Coard] (explaining that "[c]ertain core guarantees
apply in all circumstances, including situations of conflict"). Given the pervasive
phenomenon of cross-fertilization among international fora, particularly among human
rights fora, it is not uncommon to cite jurisprudence from regional fora as precedent for
universal regimes. Regional practice is also particularly useful since the regional
institutions, the combined membership of which comprises a large proportion of U.N.
member states, tend to be more active and thus have broader bases of experience
within their spheres of competence.
13.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General
Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,
11, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/21/Rev.I/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Nature of the General Legal
Obligations];Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Israel, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998).
14.
See S.C. Res. 1265, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999).
15.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131,
106 (July 9) [hereinafter
Legal Consequences].
16.
Id.
17.
See Coard,supra note 12, 39.
18.
Nature of the GeneralLegal Obligations,supra note 13, 11.
19.
Legality of the Threat, supra note 11, 25.
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situation of internal armed conflict. The situation becomes more
complex, however, when states operate abroad, especially when
acting through the context of collective action or with the assistance
of private actors. The next two Parts provide the necessary legal
framework for understanding how human rights law applies in these
circumstances.

III.

THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: STATE RESPONSIBILITY,
ATTRIBUTION, AND THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE

Human rights law, embedded in the inter-state structure of the
international legal system, generally binds states and states alone.
Human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR, place responsibility for
"respect[ing] and . . . ensur[ing]" human rights squarely upon states
parties. 20 Thus, only conduct 21 attributable to the state can
constitute an internationally wrongful act under these treaties, and
only the state can be held responsible on the international plane for
such violations.
At the same time, states are abstract entities, incapable of acting
as such. The conduct of states is the conduct of individuals whose
acts or omissions are attributable to the state. Thus, the question of
attribution not infrequently arises in disputes before human rights
bodies.
As an initial matter, it is important to bear in mind that the
question of whether an actor's conduct is attributable to a state is
analytically distinct from the question of whether that conduct is
internationally wrongful. 22 The rules of attribution form part of the

20.
ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 2. While the preambles of the ICCPR and
ICESCR both speak of duties of individuals, no normative content for this language has
been determined. The idea of duties under human rights law is generally employed in
the context of permissible restrictions on rights made through, for example, claw-back
clauses. See id. at art. 19(3). Finally, although the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights (ACHPR) sets forth duties in its operative text, these provisions have
never been used by the African Commission to find individuals responsible for breaches
of the Charter. Indeed, there are no procedures for alleging a breach of these duties.
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 3(2), June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 [hereinafter ACHPR].
21.
Such conduct may consist of an action or omission. Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Responsibility of
States]. The rules of attribution set forth in the Articles are declaratory of existing
customary international law. Id. at arts. 4-11.
22.

As a normative operation, attribution must be clearly distinguished from
the characterization of conduct as internationally wrongful. Its concern is
to establish that there is an act of the State for the purposes of
responsibility. To show that conduct is attributable to the State says
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law of state responsibility, which is codified in the International Law
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. 23 They are secondary
rules of international law, as opposed to the primary rules of
international law that place obligations upon states. As such, these
rules are of a framework nature, generally applicable across the full
spectrum of substantive international law and unconcerned with the
separate question of whether the conduct at issue conforms to what is
required by those substantive norms.
The first rule of attribution is that the conduct of an organ of a
state, including that of any individual who is an official part of the
machinery of the state 24 or of an entity legally empowered by a state
to exercise elements of governmental authority, 25 is considered to be
an act of that state. This would also include situations in which an
"organ [is] placed at the disposal of a State by another State," and the
"organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental
authority" of the former state. 26 The conduct of such actors is
attributable to the state even where an actor's conduct is ultra vires,
or beyond the scope of his or her authority, so long as he or she was
27
acting in an official capacity.
A. Attribution in the Context of Collective Action
While the lines of responsibility are relatively clear when states
act in an individual capacity in the course of a conflict, the issue of
attribution becomes more complex in the context of collective action,
particularly in light of the range of circumstances in which states

nothing, as such, about the legality or otherwise of that conduct, and
rules of attribution should not be formulated in terms which imply
otherwise.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session, at 81,
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Report of
the International Law Commission]. This distinction can be particularly difficult to
discern in analyzing the extraterritorial application of human rights law. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as will be discussed below, has at times
found the extraterritorial application of a primary rule to be triggered in part by a
finding of attribution and has also linked the issue of attribution to the scope of this
primary rule.
23.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21. The Articles, adopted by the
International Law Commission in 2001,, represent the codification and progressive
development of this area of international law. Id.
24.
Id. at art. 4.
25.
Id. at art. 5.
26.
Id. at art. 6. This rule is limited to situations in which "the organ,
originally that of one State, acts exclusively for the purposes of and on behalf of another
State and its conduct is attributed to the latter State alone." Report of the
International Law Commission, supra note 22, at 95 (emphasis added).
27.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 7. See also VelasquezRodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
169-70 (July 29, 1988)
[hereinafter Velasquez-Rodriguez Case].
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may conduct collective operations. States may simply deploy military
forces jointly or through coalitions of the willing, which may or may
not have separate legal personality. They may also contribute troops
to U.N. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.
Alternatively, they may deploy forces together with other states
acting pursuant to a U.N. mandate, while retaining command and
control. In these situations, chains of command may or may not be
unified, states may or may not retain control over their contributed
troops, and the lines of responsibility may be muddled as a result.
Given this complex array of possibilities, the issue of attribution
must be assessed in light of the particular features of each operation.
In general, the conduct of a state's military forces will be attributable
28
to that state while those forces are acting in their national capacity.
However, if troops are seconded to an intergovernmental organization
or another entity with separate international legal personality, such
that they are acting on behalf of that organization or entity 29 and are
no longer acting on behalf of their state of nationality, then their
30
conduct may no longer be attributable to their state of nationality.
In reality, the sending states of troops contributed to U.N. or
regional peace-keeping operations retain a significant degree of
control over their troops. In such situations, the precise scope of the
troops' national capacity versus their intergovernmental peacekeeping capacity may be difficult to delineate. Indeed, it may be
possible that the troops are operating in both capacities
simultaneously, in which case their conduct may be attributable to
their sending state as well as to the intergovernmental organization
through which they have been deployed.

28.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 7.
29.
While the Law of State Responsibility does not address the responsibility of
intergovernmental organizations as such, see id. at art. 57, the rules discussed in this
Part may apply by analogy. At a minimum, intergovernmental organizations are
responsible for the conduct of their own organs or officials. See Report of the
International Law Commission, supra note 22, at 361 ("[A]n [intergovernmental]
organization possesses separate legal personality under international law, and is
responsible for its own acts, i.e., for acts which are carried out by the organization
through its own organs or officials."). Regarding the responsibility of entities other
than States in a peace-keeping context, see John Cerone, Reasonable Measures in
Unreasonable Circumstances: a Legal Responsibility Framework for Human Rights
Violations in Post-Conflict Territories under UN Administration, in THE UN, HUMAN

RIGHTS AND POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS 42 (Nigel White & Dirk Klaasen eds., 2005).
30.
This is analogous to the situation referred to in Article 6 of the Articles
where the organ of one state is placed "at the disposal of' another state. Report of the
International Law Commission, supra note 22, at 361. However, this says nothing
about the issue of member State responsibility for the conduct of intergovernmental
organizations, which is a separate issue.
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B. Attribution of the Conduct of Non-State Actors

31

The conduct of non-state actors may also be attributed to a state
under certain circumstances. The conduct of a non-state actor may be
imputed to a state when: the actor is in fact acting on the instructions
of, or under the direction or control of, a state in carrying out the
conduct; 32 the actor is exercising elements of governmental authority
in the absence or default of official authorities; 33 the conduct is
subsequently adopted by a state; 34 or the conduct is that of an
insurrectional movement that becomes the new government of a
35
state.
These standards establish a fairly high threshold of state
involvement or, alternatively, de facto state action by non-state actors
accompanied by state authorization or disengagement. Instances of
simple complicity of state organs in the conduct of non-state actors
are not sufficient to render such conduct attributable to the state
36
under the traditional rules of attribution.
C. The Use of Private Contractors
The use of private contractors in the recent conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan has drawn increased attention to the relationship
between the conduct of non-state actors and state responsibility. The
rules of attribution contemplate two situations in which the conduct
of private contractors may be attributable to the state.
The first is where the contractor is de jure acting on behalf of the
state. 37 This situation is covered by Article 5 of the Articles on State
Responsibility, which applies to entities that are empowered by the

31.
The phrase "non-state actor" is here used in a relative sense. It is meant to
refer to any individual or entity that is not a de jure organ of the state whose
obligations are under consideration. Thus, it may include de jure organs of other states
or of intergovernmental organizations.
32.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 8. In the absence of specific
instructions, a fairly high degree of control has been required to attribute the conduct
to the state. According to the Commentary on the Articles,
Such conduct will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled
the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of
that operation. The principle does not extend to conduct which was only
incidentally or peripherally associated with an operation and which escaped
from the State's direction or control.
Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 22, at 104.
33.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 9.
34.
Id. at art. 11; see also infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
35.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 10.
36.
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27) (holding that provision of training, resources, and logistical support was
insufficient for the conduct of the contras to be attributable to the United States).
37.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 5.
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law of the state to exercise elements of governmental authority.
Thus, the conduct of private contractors that are legally authorized to
carry out public functions on behalf of the state will be attributable to
the state. These entities essentially become assimilated to organs of
the state when they are acting in their public capacity. Thus, their
ultra vires conduct remains attributable to the state so long as they
are acting in that capacity.
The second situation where the conduct of private contractors
may be attributable to the state is where the contractor is in fact
authorized to act on behalf of the state without the official
imprimatur of legal empowerment. 38 In such situations, it does not
matter whether the contractor is carrying out a public function.
However, this situation would be governed by Article 8 of the Articles
on State Responsibility, which, as noted above, sets a fairly high
threshold for attribution. 39 In addition, as there is not necessarily
any "official" capacity in such situations, the entity's conduct will not
be attributable to the state if such conduct was contrary to the state's
40
instructions.
Thus, as noted above, the law of state responsibility sets a
relatively high bar for attribution in these circumstances. However,
the law of state responsibility admits the possibility of lex specialis
41
where "special rules of international law" may govern.
D. Attribution in the Context of Human Rights Law
Special rules may be evolving through the practice of universal
and regional human rights mechanisms. These institutions have
increasingly found degrees of state involvement not rising to the level
established for attribution under the Articles on State Responsibility
to be sufficient to render the state responsible for the acts of nonstate actors. In the Loizidou case, for example, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the Turkish army's "effective
overall control" of northern Cyprus was sufficient to impute 42 the

38.
Id. at art. 9.
39.
Id. at art. 8.
40.
But see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment,
120 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic]. In Tadic, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber took the position that overall control of a hierarchically organized non-state
entity may be sufficient to assimilate that entity to a state organ, rendering all of its
conduct attributable to the state. See infra note 41.
41.
Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 55.
49 (1996)
42.
Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216,
[hereinafter Loizidou (merits)]. Note, however, that the Loizidou court essentially
collapsed the issue of imputability with the question of the scope of Turkey's
57.
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the European Convention. Id.
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conduct of the local administration to Turkey. 43 In adopting the
effective overall control test and finding that it was therefore not
necessary to determine whether Turkey actually exercised detailed
control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 44 the ECtHR seemed to adopt a
lower standard for attribution than that employed by the ICJ in the
Nicaragua case 45 and set forth in Article 8 of the Articles on State
46
Responsibility.
However, an even lower standard for attribution in the context of
human rights law may be evolving. A growing corpus of international

It follows from the above considerations that the continuous denial of the
applicant's access to her property in northern Cyprus and the ensuing loss of
all control over the property is a matter which falls within Turkey's
"jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 (art. 1) and is thus imputable to
Turkey.
This of course becomes problematic in the context of peace operations involving
collective action. The distinction between these questions was illustrated in Bankovi6,
in which the court found that it was unnecessary to consider the "alleged several
liability of the respondent States for an act carried out by an international organisation
of which they are members" because the court had already concluded that it was "not
satisfied that the applicants and their deceased relatives were capable of coming within
the jurisdiction of the respondent States on account of the extra-territorial act in
question." Bankovi6 v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 9 82, 83 [hereinafter
Bankovic].
43.
Loizidou (merits), supra note 42, at 56.
It is not necessary to determine whether, as the applicant and the Government
of Cyprus have suggested, Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the
policies and actions of the authorities of the "TRNC." It is obvious from the
large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus... that her
army exercises effective overall control over that part of the island. Such
control, according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the case,
entails her responsibility for the policies and actions of the "TRNC."
44.
45.

Id.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June

27).
46.
This was expressly recognized by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic, in
which it departed from the rule formulated by the ICJ for attribution of the conduct of
organized, hierarchical groups. While the ICJ had held that the proper standard for
attribution was "effective control" over the group, including direction and participation
in the particular act to be attributed, id. 115, the ICTY found "overall control" to be
sufficient and has not required direction or participation by the state in the specific
conduct, Tadic, supra note 40,
120. In finding further that the state could be held
responsible even for acts contrary to specific instructions, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
noted that, generally speaking, "the whole body of international law on State
responsibility is based on a realistic concept of accountability, which disregards legal
formalities and aims at ensuring that States entrusting some functions to individuals
or groups of individuals must answer for their actions, even when they act contrary to
their directives." Id.
121. The Appeals Chamber also made clear that it was
applying its interpretation of the rules of attribution under the Law of State
Responsibility and was thus not relying on a lex specialis theory for its departure from
the Nicaraguajudgment. Id. 9 115, 122.
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human rights jurisprudence and practice supports the proposition
that the conduct of non-state actors may be attributable to the state
where state actors are complicit in such conduct. 4 7 An example of the
application of this principle in human rights jurisprudence can be
found in the Massacre at Riofrio case of the IACHR. In that case,
petitioners alleged that members of the Colombian army collaborated
with a group of paramilitaries in the execution of a number of
individuals in the municipality of Riofrio, Colombia. 48 Before
analyzing the alleged violations of the standards of the American
Convention on Human Rights, the IACHR addressed the question of
whether the acts of paramilitaries, otherwise regarded as non-state
actors, 49 could be attributed to the State of Colombia, thus "call[ing]
into question its responsibility in accordance with international
50
law."
The IACHR recalled that the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has noted that "[i]t is sufficient to show that the infringement
of the rights recognized in the Convention has been supported or
tolerated by the government. '51 Having found evidence that "agents
of the State helped to coordinate the massacre, to carry it out, and, as

47.
See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, supra note 27,
172; African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Decision Regarding Communication No.
155/96,
61 (May 27, 2002) [hereinafter Decision]; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Report on Questions of Human Rights, Mass Exoduses, and Displaced
Persons,
30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.1 (Feb. 11, 1998) (submitted by the
Representative of the Secretary-General, Francis Deng); see also Cyprus v. Turkey,
2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 331,
81 (2001) [hereinafter Cyprus] (noting that "the
acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of
private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its
jurisdiction may engage that State's responsibility under the Convention."). However,
it should be noted that the ECtHR at times fails to distinguish clearly between human
rights violative conduct that is attributable to the state and conduct of non-state actors
that the State has failed to prevent or respond to. The lack of distinction may result in
part from the formulation of Article 1, containing the single obligation to secure rights,
which would encompass both types of conduct, rather than being expressed as two
distinct obligations (i.e., to respect and to ensure).
There has been a parallel
development in refugee law. See e.g., Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [1999]
2 A.C. 629, 631-32 (H.L.) (U.K.).
48.
Riofrio Massacre Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/01, TT 9-10
(2001) [hereinafter Riofrio], available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/
ChapterIIIMerits/Colombial 1.654.htm.
49.
Although Colombia has been found responsible for creating and supporting
such paramilitary groups as part of its counterinsurgency efforts, the subsequent
withdrawal of lawful support from, and even criminalization of, such groups rendered
untenable the argument that they were de jure state agents or otherwise authorized to
exercise elements of governmental authority.
See generally Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Colombia, OEAISer.L./VII.102, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1999).
50.
Riofrio, supra note 48, T 48.
51.
Id. It should be noted, however, that the actual conduct of state actors in
this case would have met a higher standard than that adopted by the Commission.
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discovered by domestic courts, to cover it up," the Commission
concluded that the "State is liable for the violations of the American
Convention resulting from the acts of commission or omission by its
own agents and by private individuals involved in the execution of the
52
victims.
In analyzing whether the conduct at issue amounted to a
violation of the right to life under the American Convention, the
IACHR found Colombia to be
responsible for the acts of its agents as well as for those perpetrated by
individuals who acted with their complicity to make it possible to carry
out and cover up the execution of the victims in violation of their right
not to be arbitrarily deprived of their lives, as established in Article 4 of
53
the American Convention.

It therefore found that the arbitrary deprivation of life perpetrated by
paramilitaries acting in complicity with agents of the State
54
constituted a breach of the American Convention by Colombia.
In the context of human rights law, therefore, there appears to
be a trend toward recognizing complicity as sufficient for attribution
giving rise to a breach of a state's obligation to respect rights.- It
should be noted, however, that cases in which human rights
mechanisms have found complicity sufficient for attribution have
generally involved state complicity in the conduct of non-state actors
operating within that state. It is unclear whether the same standard
55
would apply with respect to non-state actors operating abroad.
E. Caveat: Positive Obligations and the Attribution of Omission
As noted above, the question of attribution is separate in
principle from the content of international obligations. However, this
distinction may become difficult to discern in the context of a failure
of a state to fulfill positive obligations in relation to the acts of nonstate actors. In such situations, it is essential to distinguish between
the issue of whether the conduct of non-state actors is attributable to
a state and the separate question of whether a state has failed to
fulfill an affirmative obligation, should one be imposed by a primary
rule of international law, in relation to the conduct of non-state
actors.
For example, in United States v. Iran, the ICJ considered three
grounds for finding Iran responsible in relation to the embassy takeover and seizure of hostages carried out by a group of militants. First,

52.
53.

Id.
Id.

52.
57.

54.

Id.

83.

55.
See infra Part IV.C (discussion regarding the level of obligation under
human rights law).
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it considered whether alleged incitement by Iranian officials
accompanied by a failure to protect the embassy was sufficient to
render the subsequent take-over of the embassy attributable to Iran.
56
The court found that this was not a sufficient basis for attribution.
The ICJ then considered whether the Iranian government's
failure to protect the embassy violated Iran's affirmative obligation to
do so under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular
Relations. The court found that the failure of the Iranian authorities
to take steps to protect the embassy violated this obligation. 57 It is
important to note that the court did not find that the failure to
protect the embassy made the conduct of the militants attributable to
Iran.
The conduct at issue was an omission of the Iranian
authorities, i.e., the failure to take steps to protect the embassy. It
was this conduct, this failure to act, that was not in conformity with
what international law required, and Iran was therefore found to be
in violation of its affirmative duty to protect the embassy.
Finally, the court considered whether the subsequent praise of
the militants by Iranian officials, together with a request by the
Iranian government that the occupation of the embassy be
maintained, was sufficient to attribute the continuing occupation of
the embassy and detention of the hostages to Iran. Here, the court
found that Iran adopted the conduct of the militants as its own,
thereby translating the acts of the militants into acts of Iran. 58 The
court explained, "The militants, authors of the invasions and jailors of
the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose
59
acts the state itself was internationally responsible."
Thus, the ICJ found attributable to Iran the conduct of two
groups: the conduct of Iranian officials in failing to protect the
embassy and the conduct of the militants in taking over the embassy
and detaining the hostages. The ICJ made clear the importance of
the distinction between these two findings:
The Iranian authorities' decision to continue the subjection of the
premises of the United States Embassy to occupation by militants and
of the Embassy staff to detention as hostages, clearly gave rise to
repeated and multiple breaches of the applicable provisions of the
Vienna Conventions even more serious than those which arose from
their failure to take any steps to prevent the attacks on the inviolability
60
of these premises and staff.

56.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 4 (May 24).
57.
Id. at 95.
58.
Id. at 62-63.
59.
Id. at 74.
60.
Id. at 76.
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Notwithstanding the distinction drawn by the court, some
scholars have conflated these modes of responsibility. In the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks against targets in the
United States, some scholars argued that United States v. Iran stood
for the proposition that acquiescence by a state in the conduct of nonstate actors was sufficient to find that conduct attributable to the
state. That is clearly not the case under the rules of attribution as
elaborated by the International Law Commission (ILC). While a
state's responsibility may be engaged in relation to its own conducti.e. its own failure to take steps to prevent or respond to the acts of
non-state actors-this is quite distinct from finding the conduct of the
non-state actors to be attributable to the state. In the context of the
9/11 attacks, a finding that Afghanistan had breached its affirmative
duty to take steps to prevent and respond to terrorist activity would
give rise to an obligation on the part of Afghanistan to bring its
conduct into conformity with its obligations and to make reparations.
In contrast, to find that the attacks were attributable to Afghanistan
could give rise to the right of self-defense, justifying the use of armed
force against Afghanistan.
The attribution of conduct consisting of omissions presents
conceptual difficulties in part because conduct consisting of omissions
is, in a sense, always attributable. As omission is a lack of action, an
actor is not required. Hence, the state is essentially in a constant
state of omission. However, in order for an omission to constitute a
basis of responsibility, there must be a duty to act. The question of
establishing a duty to act will turn on the content of the relevant
primary rule. Thus, in these circumstances, the issue of attribution
collapses into the content of the primary rule.
F. The Obligation to Respect Versus the Obligation to Ensure
The distinction between attribution of the conduct of non-state
actors and a state's responsibility for its omissions in relation to the
conduct of non-state actors has special significance in the context of
human rights law. Where human rights violative conduct 6 1 is
attributable to a state, the state will have breached an obligation of
result, and responsibility will arise immediately. Where such conduct
is not attributable to a state, the question of whether human rights
law has been violated will be determined by the quality of the state's

61.
In this Article, the terms "human rights violative conduct" or "human right
violation," do not refer to conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of human
rights law. Instead, they refer to conduct that would constitute an impermissible
interference with one or more human rights if such conduct were attributed to the
state. Thus, a human rights violation committed by a non-state actor whose conduct is
not otherwise attributable to the state would not necessarily constitute a violation of
human rights law. See generally id. at 8.
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response to this conduct, generally governed by a "best efforts"
62
standard.
As noted above, Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states, "Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant." 63 In its General
Comments, the Human Rights Committee has construed this
provision to oblige states to protect the rights contained in the
Covenant against non-state interference. 6 4 In General Comment 31,
the Committee stated:
[Tihe positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State,
not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also
against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair
the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to
application between private persons or entities. There may be
circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required
by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those
rights, 6 5 as a result of States Parties' permitting or failing to take
appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish,

62.
Nature of the General Legal Obligations, supra note 13,
8; VelasquezRodriguez Case, supra note 27, 172.
63.
ICCPR, supra note 8 (emphasis added). Customary law may entail a more
limited level of obligation. It is unclear, for example, whether customary law requires
states to "ensure" rights, as that term has been interpreted by human rights
mechanisms. For example, the U.S. Restatement provides that a
state violates international law when, as a matter of policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones any of the following:
(a.) Genocide,
(b.) Slavery or slave trade,
(c.)

Murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,

(d.) Torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e.) Prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f.)

Systematic racial discrimination, or

(g.) A consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987).

By limiting this obligation to situations when the State, "as a matter of
policy,... practices, encourages, or condones" the violations, this passage may be read
to exclude an obligation to take affirmative steps to prevent or respond to violations by
non-state actors, an obligation which clearly exists under the major human rights
treaties. Id.
64.
Id. § 702 cmts. 6, 10, 16-18, 20-21, 27-28, 31.
65.
Id. However, note that the Committee here risks conflating the distinction
just drawn. The Committee would have been better advised to characterize such
conduct as a failure to ensure rights as opposed to a violation of rights.
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investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons
66
or entities.

The regional human rights institutions have similarly
interpreted comparable provisions 67 in their respective treaties. 68 In
the Velisquez-Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights found that agents who acted under cover of public authority
carried out the disappearance of Manfredo Velisquez. 69 The court
stated, however, that
even had that fact not been proven, the failure of the State apparatus to
act, which is clearly proven, is a failure on the part of Honduras to
fulfill the duties it assumed under Article 1(1) of the Convention, which
obligated it to ensure Manfredo Veldsquez the free and full exercise of
70
his human rights.

Earlier in its opinion, the court had surmised, "what is decisive is
whether a violation of the rights recognized by the Convention has
occurred with the support or the acquiescence of the government, or
whether the State has allowed the act to take place without taking
measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible." 71 This
statement reflects the twin obligations to respect and ensure human
rights. In either case, the government would be held responsible. In
the former case, where the violation has occurred with the support or
the acquiescence of the government, the state would be directly
responsible for the violative act itself. In the latter case, the state
would be responsible for failing to ensure the right through the
exercise of due diligence. Thus, human rights violations committed
by non-state actors may give rise to state responsibility even when
there is no connection between the perpetrators and the state. The
obligation to ensure rights under the major human rights treaties
requires states to take reasonable, effective steps to prevent and to
respond to human rights violations committed by non-state actors.

66.
Id. at cmt. 31.
67.
See ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 1; European Convention, supra note 8, at
art. 1. Article 1 of the European Convention requires the High Contracting Parties to
"secure" the rights contained in the Convention. European Convention, supra note 8.
The European Convention has interpreted Article 1 to entail a scope of obligation
similar to that encompassed by the phrase "to respect and to ensure" as interpreted by
the Human Rights Committee. 1lacu v. Moldova, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 318, 313 (2004)
[hereinafter Ila~cu]. The ACHPR has gone farther, interpreting Article 1 of the African
Charter, which obliges states to "recognize" rights and to "adopt ... measures to give
effect to them," to entail the obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the
rights contained in the Charter. Decision,supra note 47, 18.
68.
See Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, supra note 27,
172; A v. United Kingdom,
1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2692, 22; Kili v. Turkey, 2000-I1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 128,
110;
Human Rights Committee, Jimdnez v. Colombia, Communication No. 859/1999,
7.2,
9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CI74ID/859/1999(Mar. 25, 2002).
69.
Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, supra note 27, 172.
70.
Id. T 182.
71.
Id. T 173.
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As stated by the Inter-American Court in Veldsquez-Rodriguez:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a
private person or because the person responsible has not been
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the
72
Convention.

The court reasoned that the Article 1(1) obligation to ensure the free
and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention implied
the duty of the state parties to "organize the governmental apparatus
and, in general, all the structures through which public power is
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and
full enjoyment of human rights. ' 73 The court elaborated on the states'
duties to "prevent the violation or respond to it," stating, "the States
must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights
recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to
restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for
damages resulting from the violation." 74
The "due diligence"
standard "has been generally accepted as a measure of evaluating a
State's responsibility for violation of human rights by private
actors."

75

In most cases, due diligence to prevent violations would require
legislative prohibition of the violative behavior and enforcement.
Legislative prohibition and enforcement alone, however, are not
generally successful in preventing violations and are thus insufficient
to meet a state's obligation.

States must take effective measures to
meet their obligations in this context. This follows from the principle

76
of good faith and has been echoed by various human rights bodies.

72.
Id. 172.
73.
Id.
166; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Final Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/64 (Jan.
20, 1995) (submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Felix Ermacora).
74.
Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, supra note 27, 167.
75.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Preliminary Report on Violence
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 103, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov.
22, 1994) (submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Radhika Coomaraswamy); see
generally John Cerone, The Human Rights Framework Applicable to Trafficking in
Persons and its Incorporation into UNMIK Regulation 2001/4, 7 Y.B. INT'L PEACE
OPERATIONS 43 (2001).
76.
See Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, supra note 27,
172; Artico v. Italy, App.
6694/74, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 36 (1980); Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Sept. 12, 1994, CESCR General Comment 5: Persons With Disabilities, 11;
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16: Compilation of General Comments
and GeneralRecommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 11, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994).
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It is for this reason that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
emphasized that states are under a duty to employ
all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature
that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any
violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such,
may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to
77
indemnify the victims for damages.

The court recognized that "[i]t is not possible to make a detailed list of
all such measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of
each State Party. ' 78 In addition, they will vary with the nature of the
right violated. However, a list of general measures can be extracted
from international practice, 79 bearing in mind the principles of
effectiveness and reasonableness. 80
Such measures are particularly important in situations where
the rule of law has not been firmly established. In such cases, the
government may be unable to effectively punish perpetrators, 81 and
consequently, must more diligently act to prevent violations by
addressing the underlying conditions that lead to them and to
respond to them through the provision of reparations. 82 Thus, the
scope of obligation under human rights law clearly reaches the
conduct of non-state actors, even when there is no link between the
non-state actors and the state. However, it must be recalled that the
obligation does not itself extend to the non-state actors such that they
become responsible under international law for the violations they

perpetrate.
It should be noted that the line between complicity sufficient for
attribution and failure to exercise due diligence is highly fact-

77.
Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, supra note 27, 175.
78.
Id.
79.
Recent practice has included measures such as education and awarenessraising, government condemnation of violations, rehabilitation and support services for
victims, training for law enforcement personnel, ratification and implementation of
other international human rights instruments, improving access to legal remedies on
both the domestic and international planes, implementation of the recommendations of
international human rights bodies and mechanisms, protection of complainants and
witnesses to violations, promoting research and compiling statistics on violations,
publishing reports on the state's responses to violations, providing financial support to
organizations that combat discrimination, and changing patterns of socialization that
perpetuate discrimination. See generally Cerone, supra note 75.
80.
See Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs and the Responsibilities
of States, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 23 (1989) (asserting that due diligence requires
"reasonable measures of prevention that a well administered government could be
expected to exercise under similar circumstances").
81.
See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia,
58, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/101 (Feb. 26, 1999).
82.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Report on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences,
37, 141, U.N. Doc. E.CN.4/1996/53 (Feb. 5,
1996) (submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Radhika Coomaraswamy).
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sensitive, and that these two modes of responsibility often blur into
each other.8 3 In addition, state responsibility may be engaged by the
state's failure to provide an effective remedy in accordance with its
treaty obligations. 84 It is important to remember that although the
same acts may implicate all three types of responsibility, these are
separate modes of state responsibility and breaches of independent
legal obligations. The application of various related modes of state
responsibility is illustrated in the Riofrio case described above. In
that case, the IACHR found Colombia responsible for violations of the
rights to life and humane treatment perpetrated by paramilitaries
acting in complicity with state agents, violation of the right to judicial
protection, and failure5 to ensure the rights protected under the
8
American Convention.
Lastly, as with the evolving jurisprudence finding complicity
sufficient for attribution, much of the jurisprudence on responsibility
for preventing and responding to violations committed by non-state
actors has developed in the context of non-state actors operating
within the relevant state's territory. It is unclear to what extent this
interpretation of the obligation to ensure rights can be transposed to
an extraterritorial context.

IV. THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO
INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE STATE'S TERRITORY

The great innovation of human rights law was that it regulated
the way a state treated those within its jurisdiction. No longer could
a state invoke the principle of non-intervention as an impermeable
barrier to international scrutiny of its conduct vis-A-vis its own
Conversely, the notion that international law took
populace.
cognizance of and regulated a state's conduct on the territory of other
states and toward foreign nationals was established long before the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. 86 It is

177 ("[W]here the acts of
83.
See Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, supra note 27,
private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties
are aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the
international plane.").
Under Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR, each state party undertakes "[t]o
84.
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity." ICCPR, supra note 8; see also European
Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13.
Riofrio, supra note 48, 19.
85.
86.
This included violations perpetrated against foreign nationals in third
states.
(1937).

See generally MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN,

DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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therefore somewhat ironic that a great controversy has erupted in
recent years as to whether the norms of human rights law may be
87
applied to a state's extraterritorial conduct.
Prior to the development of human rights law, international law
was concerned almost exclusively with states' external conduct.
Abuses committed within a state's territory were virtually invisible to
international law unless the victim was a foreign national and the
state of nationality was willing to espouse the claim on the inter-state
level. Thus, human rights law filled a serious gap by regulating the
way a state treated its own people. Human rights law has developed
tremendously over the past few decades, and individuals are
receiving increasing levels of protection against abuses committed by
their own governments-levels of protection exceeding those afforded
under the traditional law of state responsibility for injury to aliens.
But is this protection to be afforded only vis-A-vis the state's own
citizenry?
Relatively early on, international and regional human rights
institutions made clear that human rights law applied to all those
within the state's territory, even to those who were not nationals of
that state, underscoring the universality of the concept of human
rights.8 8 Thus, the heightened protection of human rights law applies
irrespective of the nationality of the victim. A separate question is
whether this protection applies irrespective of the physical location of
the victim vis-A-vis the state. Most of the jurisprudence of human
rights bodies, which have greatly elaborated on the content of states'
obligations under the various human rights treaties, has been
developed in the context of alleged violations committed on the
territory of the respective state party. Can these same standards be
transposed onto the state's conduct abroad?
To answer this question, it is essential to closely examine the
scope of human rights obligations.
A. The Scope of Human Rights Obligations
In an effort to bring order to an otherwise chaotic array of
judicial (and quasi-judicial) decisions, this Part will provide a
framework for delineating the scope of human rights obligations by

87.
Although the present analysis at times refers to "extraterritorial conduct,"
the focus of the analysis is on a state's conduct in relation to individuals outside the
state's territory. It may be that a state's conduct occurring on its own territory is
alleged to infringe the rights of those situated outside of that territory. See infra notes
86-90 and accompanying text.
The treaties refer to "all individuals" (ICCPR), "all persons" (ACHR), or
88.
"everyone" (European Convention) within the States Parties' jurisdiction. The plain
language of the treaties makes clear that they apply to foreign nationals within their
territory. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that certain rights are limited to
"citizens." See e.g. ICCPR, art. 25.
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examining three different parameters: the scope of beneficiaries, the
range of rights applicable, and the level of obligation. The scope of
beneficiaries refers to those individuals whose rights must be
respected and ensured by the relevant state (or other subject of
obligation under human rights law).8 9 The range of rights applicable
refers to the question of which rights apply in situations where the
state may not be bound to recognize the full range of rights provided
under treaty or customary law. The level of obligation refers to the
degree of positive action a state must undertake to meet its
obligations under human rights law. It should be noted that the scope
of obligation may vary depending upon whether the relevant source of
law is treaty or custom as well as the context in which the state is
operating.
B.

Scope of Beneficiaries

States Parties to the ICCPR are not bound to respect and ensure
the rights of all individuals everywhere. For example, it is clear that,
absent special circumstances, States Parties are not required to
protect the rights of individuals living in other countries from
violations perpetrated by the governments of those countries or by
non-state actors operating there. As noted above, a common feature
of the major human rights treaties is that the scope of beneficiaries is
typically limited to those within a state's territory or subject to its
jurisdiction. While it was initially unclear whether this language
could encompass a state's conduct abroad, the extraterritorial
application of human rights treaties has now been clearly established
in the jurisprudence of several international judicial and quasijudicial bodies.
1.

The Approach of U.N. and U.N.-Related Institutions

The Human Rights Committee has consistently held that the
ICCPR can have extraterritorial application,9" clearly demonstrating

89.
In general, as states are the typical subjects of obligations under human
rights law, they are referred to throughout the analysis. However, in most contexts,
intergovernmental organizations may also be included to the extent that they may be
deemed subjects of obligations under human rights law. Thus, throughout this
analysis "states" is used as short-hand for "subjects of obligations under human rights
law."
90.
See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Israel, T 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter Concluding Observations: Israel];Human Rights Committee, Comments on
United States of America,
19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (Apr. 7, 1995); Human
Rights Committee, Summary record of the 1253rd meeting : Iran, 63, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR/1253 (July 30, 1993).
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its understanding that a state's jurisdiction extends beyond its
territorial boundaries. In particular, it has found that the expressed
scope of Article 2(1) "does not imply that the State party concerned
cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the
Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another
State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State
or in opposition to it." 9 1 In Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, the
Committee held that Uruguay violated its obligations under the
Covenant when its security forces abducted and tortured a
Uruguayan citizen then living in Argentina. 9 2 In line with Article
5(1), 9 3 the Committee reasoned that "it would be unconscionable to so
interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to
permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the
territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on
its own territory. '94 Initially, it was unclear whether the Committee's
holding in Lopez was strictly limited to extraterritorial violations
committed against a state's own national, that factor providing a solid
basis for finding that the victim was subject to the perpetrating
state's jurisdiction. However, the Committee's recent practice makes
clear that the Covenant applies to a state's conduct abroad, even with
respect to its treatment of foreign nationals.
In its General Comment 31, the Human Rights Committee
asserted that "a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid
down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control
of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the
State Party." 95 Similarly, after affirming that the "enjoyment of
Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must
also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or
statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and
other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to
the jurisdiction of the State Party, ' 96 the Committee noted,
[t]his principle also applies to those within the power or effective
control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory,
regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control
was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a

91.
Communication No. 52/1979, at 88,
12.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984)
[hereinafter Lopez]; see generally John Cerone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR
Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 469 (2001).
92.
Lopez, supra note 91, 13.
93.
Article 5(1) of the ICCPR states, "[niothing in the present Covenant may be
interpreted as implying . . . any right to engage in any activity . . . aimed at the

destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein." ICCPR, supra note 8,
at art. 5.
94.
Lopez, supra note 91, 12.3.
95.
Nature of the GeneralLegal Obligations, supranote 13, 10.
96.
Id.
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State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace97
enforcement operation.

The Committee confirmed its position in the context of military
occupation. In response to the Israeli government's assertion that the
ICCPR did not apply outside of a state's territory, especially in the
context of armed conflict or occupation, the Committee stated:
Nor does the applicability of the regime of international humanitarian
law preclude accountability of States parties under article 2, paragraph
1, of the Covenant for the actions of their authorities outside their own
territories, including in occupied territories. The Committee therefore
reiterates that, in the current circumstances, the provisions of the
Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied
Territories, for all conduct by the State party's authorities or agents in
those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the
Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel
98
under the principles of public international law.

The Committee's position was endorsed in part by the ICJ in its 2004
Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences on the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Israeli Wall Opinion). 99
In that case, the ICJ opined that the ICCPR, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) applied to Israel's
conduct in the occupied territories. 100
In particular, after citing the position of the Human Rights
Committee, the ICJ found "that the [ICCPR] is applicable in respect
of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its
own territory." 101 However, in contrast to the Human Rights
Committee's broad reference to conduct by authorities "that affect the
enjoyment of rights," the court employed the more specific, and
arguably circular, formulation "acts done .. .in the exercise of its
jurisdiction."'1 2 It seems that the ICJ may have intended to establish
a narrower standard in this respect. The court did not cite General
Comment 31 or its "power or effective control standard," even though
that Comment was adopted by the Human Rights Committee several
10 3
months before the ICJ rendered its opinion.
The ICJ did not provide specific guidance as to what constitutes
acts done by a state in the exercise of its jurisdiction. While the court
clearly regarded this standard as having been met in the situation of

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
2004).

Id.
Concluding Observations:Israel, supra note 90, 7 11.
Legal Consequences, supra note 15, 7 109.
Id.
111-13.
Id.
111.
Id.; Concluding Observations:Israel,supra note 90, T 11.
Nature of the General Legal Obligations, supra note 13 (adopted on May 26,
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occupation, the court did not reject the Committee's broader
interpretation. Indeed the court cited Lopez, referring to the arrests
in those cases as exercises of jurisdiction. 10 4 Thus, it would appear
that an exercise of jurisdiction for the purpose of applying the ICCPR
does not require as a pre-condition territorial control.
In contrast, the ICJ seemed to require territorial control to
trigger application of the ICESCR. After noting that Article 2 of the
ICESCR does not contain a provision circumscribing the scope of
States Parties' obligations, 10 5 the ICJ acknowledged that the rights
enumerated therein are "essentially territorial.' ' 0 6 Nonetheless, the
court found that "it is not to be excluded that it applies both to
territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over
which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction."'1 7 Here the court
appears to limit more narrowly the circumstances in which the
ICESCR would apply extraterritorially. Rather than referring simply
to the exercise of jurisdiction, the court seems to require the exercise
of territorial jurisdiction, which implies control over territory and not
just over individuals.
As for the CRC, the court simply noted Article 2 of the CRC,
which provides that "States Parties shall respect and ensure the
rights set forth in the . . . Convention to each child within their
jurisdiction . . .," and found that the "Convention is therefore

applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territory."' 08 Given the
absence of any separate analysis of the CRC, it is unclear what
standard the court applied in finding that Convention applicable. 109
The ICJ again addressed the issue of extraterritorial application
of human rights law in its 2005 judgment in Democratic Republic of

104.
Legal Consequences, supra note 15, 109.
105.
It should be noted, however, that the ICESCR imposes an obligation upon
State Parties to take steps, "individually and through international assistance and cooperation," toward the progressive realization of the rights contained in the Covenant.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), art. 2, 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Jan. 3, 1976).
To the extent this implies an obligation on state parties to work jointly toward
realization of the Covenant rights for all people (or at least all those individuals within
State Parties to the Covenant), the ICESCR may incorporate an element of
extraterritoriality.
106.
Legal Consequences, supra note 15, 112.
107.
Id.
The court cited with approval the finding of the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights that the "State party's obligations under the
Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective control." Id. While
this may be interpreted to apply to effective control over either territories or
populations, it is difficult to conceive of effective control of a population, as opposed to
certain individuals, without territorial control.
108.
Id.
113.
109.
Given the similarity between Article 2 of the CRC and Article 2 of the
ICCPR, it may be surmised that the court applied the same standard to both. It should
be noted, however, that the CRC contains economic and social rights as well as civil
and political rights. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Congo (DRC) v. Uganda.n 0 This is the first time the issue has been
addressed by the court in a contentious case. In Congo v. Uganda, the
court found that the conduct of Ugandan forces on Congolese territory
gave rise to numerous violations of Uganda's obligations under
several human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), and the CRC."'
To address the DRC's allegations that Uganda had violated
international humanitarian law and human rights law, the ICJ found
it "essential" to first "consider the question as to whether or not
Uganda was an occupying Power in the parts of Congolese territory
where its troops were present at the relevant time." 112 After
concluding that Uganda was an occupying power in Ituri (a district
within the DRC), the court found that Article 43 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations required Uganda "to take all the measures in its power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the
occupied area, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws
in force in the DRC." 113 The court found that this obligation
"comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of
' 4
violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third party.""
The court then proceeded to examine the DRC's submissions
concerning alleged violations by Uganda. After noting that "it is not
necessary for the Court to make findings of fact with regard to each
individual incident alleged," the court considered a number of U.N.
and NGO reports documenting abuses committed by or with the
acquiescence of Ugandan forces. 1' 5 The court considered that
it ha[d] credible evidence sufficient to conclude that the UPDF troops
committed acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane
treatment of the civilian population, destroyed villages and civilian

110.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. No. 116 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
ico/icoframe.htm [hereinafter Armed Activities].
111.
Id. 219.
Id.
166.
112.
Id.
178.
113.
114.
Id. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277. It thus appears that the court found international human rights law
incorporated into the law of occupation through Article 43's reference to "the laws in
force in the country."
115.
Armed Activities, supra note 110, 205.
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buildings, failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets
and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants,
incited ethnic conflict and took no steps to put an end to such conflicts,
was involved in the training of child soldiers, and did not take
measures to ensure respect for human rights and international
1 16
humanitarian law in the occupied territories.

While it is unclear whether the phrase "in the occupied territories"
modifies all of the enumerate abuses, it seems likely that it refers
only to the final clause, "did not take measures to ensure." The
documentation referred to by the court included massive numbers of
abuses committed in various parts of the DRC, including areas
beyond the territory in which the court had found Uganda to be an
occupying power.
The court then considered which rules and principles of human
rights and humanitarian law were relevant in the instant case. In
doing so, it recalled that in its Israeli Wall Opinion, the court had
"concluded that international human rights instruments are
applicable 'in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its
jurisdiction outside its own territory,' particularly in occupied
territories. 11 7 It then found that the ICCPR, the ACHPR, the CRC,
and the CRC's Optional Protocol on Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, as well as a number of international humanitarian
law instruments were "applicable, as relevant, in the present case." 118
In view of its generalized factual findings, the court found that
Uganda had breached each of these treaties. 119 The court thus
concluded:
Uganda is internationally responsible for violations of international
human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by
the UPDF and by its members in the territory bf the DRC and for
failing to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri in
respect of violations of international human rights law and
120
international humanitarian law in the occupied territory.

Although the characteristically imprecise language employed by the
ICJ makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions, there appear to have
been three significant developments in the court's jurisprudence.
First, the court seemed to find two separate bases for the application
of human rights law to the conduct of Ugandan forces operating in
the DRC. In addition to reiterating the rule that human rights
treaties are applicable "in respect of acts done by a state in the
exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory," the court also

116.

Id. T 211.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

216.
217.
219.
220.
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found human rights law to be incorporated into the humanitarian law
of occupation.121
Second, and directly related to the first, the court made clear
that human rights treaties may apply to a state's conduct even where
that state's level of control falls short of that of an occupying power.
As noted above, while the court did find Uganda to be an occupying
power in Ituri, it also appeared to hold Uganda responsible for human
rights violations committed elsewhere in the DRC. Indeed, in
restating the "exercise of its jurisdiction" rule, the court added
"particularly in occupied territories," making it clear that application
to a state's conduct in occupied territory is but one example of
situations in which human rights treaties apply extraterritorially.
The third significant development is that the court seems to
indicate that there may be a single standard for all human rights
treaties. 122 In the Israeli Wall Opinion, the court had found that the
ICCPR "is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise
of its jurisdiction outside its own territory." 123 While it also found the
ICESCR and CRC applicable in that opinion, it seemed to adopt a
slightly higher standard for the ICESCR, and possibly also for the
CRC, as noted above. However, in restating this rule in Congo v.
Uganda, the court did not refer specifically to the ICCPR and stated
instead that "internationalhuman rights instruments are applicable
'in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its
jurisdiction."'' 12 4 It then appears to employ this standard in finding
applicable the ICCPR, the CRC and its Optional Protocol, and the

121.
Id. 217. This of course begs the question of whether it would matter if
Uganda was not a party to the relevant human rights treaties. If "laws in force in the
country" includes human rights treaty obligations of the occupied state, then it would
seem that it would not matter if the occupying power was itself a party to the those
treaties as long as the occupier was bound by the rule contained in Article 43 (which
the court found to be binding on the Parties as customary law). In such a case, the
occupier would be bound to observe those human rights obligations only within the
occupied territory. One could perhaps argue that this interpretation would be limited
to monist countries, where there would be a closer relationship between treaties
binding upon and "laws in force in" the state. However, this would seem an
inappropriate distinction to make as a matter of international law (i.e., to find that the
content of the state's obligation turned upon the relationship between that state's
municipal law and its international obligations).
122.
This would not likely apply to suppression treaties such as the Convention
Against Torture (CAT) to the extent such treaties could fall within the category of
"international human rights instruments," due to the different nature and mode of
operation of such treaties. The scope limitation in CAT serves a different function and
different parts of that treaty are subject to different scope limitations.
123.
Legal Consequences, supranote 15, 111.
124.
Armed Activities, supra note 110, 216.
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ACHPR. Both the ACHPR and CRC provide for economic and social
125
rights as well as civil and political rights.
Ultimately, however, the Congo v. Uganda judgment provides
very little guidance as to what constitutes an act done by a state in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Since the court refrained from making
specific findings of fact, the most that can be said is that at least some
of the acts of the Ugandan forces documented in the court's case-file
met this standard and that some of these acts occurred in territories
where Uganda was not an occupying power.
2.

The Approach of Regional Human Rights Systems

Regional human rights institutions 126 have generated more
extensive jurisprudence on this issue. Both the Inter-American and
European human rights bodies have found that regional human
rights treaties apply to extraterritorial conduct.
a.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

The IACHR has applied a relatively low threshold for
extraterritorial application of Inter-American human rights law,
simply requiring control over the individuals whose rights have been
violated. In Coard et al. v. the United States, the Commission
examined allegations that the military action led by U.S. armed
forces in Grenada in October 1983 violated a series of norms of
international human rights and humanitarian law. In the course of
its analysis, the Commission found that the phrase "subject to its
jurisdiction" 127 "may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct
with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present
in the territory of one state, but subject to the control of another
state-usually through the acts of the latter's agents abroad. ' 128 The

125.
The court did not include the ICESCR in the list of applicable treaties,
despite the fact that both the DRC and Uganda are parties. The DRC did not expressly
allege violations of the ICESCR by Uganda. See Armed Activities, supra note 110.

126.
The ACHPR does not contain language limiting the scope of application of
the Charter to the territory or jurisdiction of State Parties. Article 1 of the ACHPR
simply states that "parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and
freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other
measures to give effect to them." ACHPR, supra note 20, at art. 1.
127.
Coard, supra note 12, T 37. While the Declaration does not contain
language expressly narrowing the scope of its application to individuals "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the State Party, the Commission read in this requirement. Id. "Given
that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity, each American
State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction."
Id.
128.
Id. This standard was recently reaffirmed in a letter from the InterAmerican Commission to the U.S. government indicating precautionary measures in
respect of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

JUAN E. MENDEZ, DETAINEES IN
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Commission further stated, "In principle, the inquiry turns not on the
presumed victim's nationality or presence within a particular
geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances,
the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and
129
control."
The IACHR made clear that neither the victim's nationality nor
geographic location were decisive and set forth the criteria of
authority and control over the victim.' 3 0 The petitioners in this case,
having been taken into custody by U.S. forces, were clearly under the
authority and control of the United States.
Notwithstanding the broad language employed by the
Commission, it could be argued that certain facts in this case limit
the reach of its holding. Since the petitioners were placed in
detention on U.S. military vessels, a finding of jurisdiction could be
grounded on this fact alone. 13 1 Similarly, petitioners had alleged that
at the time they were arrested, the United States had already
consolidated its control over Grenada. It could thus be argued that it
was this territorial control that enabled the Commission to find that
the petitioners were under the authority and control of the United
States. However, the Commission made no mention of either of these
facts in its analysis. A contemporaneous case confirms that this was
not an oversight.
In Alejandre v. Cuba, petitioners alleged that a military aircraft
belonging to the Cuban Air Force shot down two unarmed civilian
light airplanes resulting in the deaths of the four occupants of those
airplanes. 132 The IACHR examined the evidence and found that the
victims died as a consequence of direct actions taken "by agents of the
Cuban State in international airspace.' 3 3
In determining whether the victims were within the jurisdiction
of Cuba, the Commission again cited the standard of authority and
control. 134 In this case, the victims were clearly not on Cuban
territory nor on any territory over which Cuba had any control, they
were not in a Cuban vessel, and their bodies were not subsequently

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA; REQUEST FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES (2002), available

at http://www.umn.edulhumanrts/cases/guantanamo-2003.html (citing string of cases).
129.
Coard, supra note 12, 37.
130.

Id.

38-44.

131.
However, the
petitioners, which did not
that they were regarded
time of their arrest.
132.
Alejandre v.
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc.
133.
Id. 25.
134.
Id.
23. The
Coard. Coard, supranote

Commission also considered whether the initial arrest of the
occur on the ship, was a breach of U.S. obligations, indicating
as within the jurisdiction of the United States prior to the
Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 86/99,
3 rev. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Alejandre].
Commission's language was almost identical to that used in
12, 37.
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brought within Cuban territory. 135 Further, while two of the victims
36
were Cuban-born, the other two were born in the United States.'
Thus, nationality could not serve as the jurisdictional link between
the victims and Cuba. Authority and control in this case had to be
found solely in the relationship between the agents of Cuba and the
victims in the circumstances at the time of the incident.
The Commission found no evidence of any dialogue between
Cuban armed forces and the victims, stating, "[a]t no time did [they]
notify or warn the civilian airplanes, try to use other interception
methods, or give them an opportunity to land."'1 37 Nor were there any
indicia of control other than the simple fact that the Cuban military
aircraft had the victims in their cross-hairs. As noted by the
Commission, their "first and only response was the intentional
138
destruction of the civilian airplanes and their four occupants."'
Nonetheless, the Commission found this to constitute "conclusive
evidence that agents of the Cuban State, although outside their
territory, placed the civilian pilots . . . under their authority,' 1 3 9 and
the Commission therefore held that the victims were within the
jurisdiction of Cuba for the purpose of applying Cuba's human rights
140
obligations.

135.
Their airplanes were U.S.-registered.
136.
Alejandre, supra note 132, 9 9-11.
137.
Id.
8.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
25. It may be worth noting that the Commission used only the term
"authority" in this context and did not expressly find the victims to be under the
"control" of Cuba. This may be interpreted to permit extraterritorial application in
situations where individuals are subject to a state's authority but are not necessarily
within its control. Further, in the immediately preceding sentence, when restating the
standard for extraterritorial application, the Commission stated: "The fact that the
events took place outside Cuban jurisdiction does not limit the Commission's
competence ratione loci, because, as previously stated, when agents of a state, whether
military or civilian, exercise power and authority over persons outside national
territory, the state's obligation to respect human rights continues." Id. (emphasis
added). Again, the Commission makes no mention of control. This leaves open the
question of what constitutes placing individuals "under their authority." It seems in
this case that the agents of the Cuban State placed the victims under their authority
by intentionally shooting down their plane. In other words, the human rights violative
act itself constituted the relationship necessary to establish that the victims were
within Cuban jurisdiction for the purposes of applying Cuba's human rights
obligations. Following this line of reasoning, any intentional infringement by a state of
the rights of individuals anywhere would be sufficient to bring those individuals within
the jurisdiction of that state for the purpose of applying its human rights obligations.
As noted below, the ECtHR has considered such a conclusion to render "superfluous
and devoid of any purpose" the requirement that individuals be "within the
jurisdiction" of State Parties. Bankovi6, supra note 42,
75. The flaw in the court's
reasoning is its failure to distinguish between negative and positive obligations. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.2.b.
140.
Alejandre, supra note 132, 25.
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Thus, the IACHR has established a relatively low threshold for
the extraterritorial application of Inter-American human rights law.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a situation where human rights
violations perpetrated by a state agent would fail to meet this test.141
b.

The European Commission and Court of Human Rights

In contrast to the approach of the Inter-American system, the
jurisprudence of the European System has been more cautious,
careful to avoid an interpretation that would render the European
Convention applicable to all state conduct across the globe.
The ECtHR has set forth various standards for determining
whether individuals are within the jurisdiction of Contracting States
(i.e., States Parties) for the purpose of applying the European
Convention on Human Rights to their conduct abroad. It has found
the Convention to apply where a Contracting State exercises effective
overall control of territory beyond its borders, 14 2 as well as in certain
other limited circumstances where agents of that state carry out a
143
governmental function on the territory of another state.
The early jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human
Rights seemed to correspond more closely to the approach of the
Human Rights Committee. In the case of W.M. v. Denmark, in which
a German citizen alleged human rights violative conduct on the part
of the Danish ambassador in Berlin, the European Commission found
it clear that
authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular agents,
bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State to
the extent that they exercise authority over such persons or property.
In so far as they affect such persons or property by their acts or
144
omissions, the responsibility of the State is engaged.

While it ultimately did not find a violation in that case, the breadth of
the European Commission's language closely paralleled that
employed by the Human Rights Committee in Lopez.
The ECtHR initially appeared to employ a similarly broad
understanding of jurisdiction. In the case of Drozd v. France, the
court noted that "[t]he term 'jurisdiction' is not limited to the national

141.
However, the IACHR recently rejected a petition that conduct of U.S. forces
in Iraq violated Inter-American human rights law. The Commission did not provide
reasons for rejecting the petition, but it may have been due to the fact that the alleged
violations occurred outside of the region. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
142.
See Cyprus, supra note 47,
80-81.
143.
See generally Bankovi6, supra note 42. As noted below, the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR is presently in flux with regard to this issue. Recent cases seem to
establish a lower standard.
144.
App. No. 17392/90, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD28, 1 (1993) [hereinafter W.M.].
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territory of the High Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be
involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside
their own territory."'14 5 In that case, the applicant contended that
French and Spanish judges who had been seconded to Andorran
courts violated their rights under the Convention. 146 The court began
its analysis of whether the applicants came within the jurisdiction of
147
France or Spain by restating the question as one of attribution:
"The question to be decided here is whether the acts complained of by
Mr. Drozd and Mr. Janousek can be attributed to France or Spain or
both, even though they were not performed on the territory of those
States." 148 Although it ultimately found that the conduct of the judges
was not attributable to France or Spain, the ECtHR implied that had
it been attributable, individuals over whom the judges exercised
authority would have been within the jurisdiction of those countries.
However, in later cases, the ECtHR seemed to take a somewhat
different approach. In a series of cases relating to the Turkish
occupation of northern Cyprus, the court began to place greater
emphasis on territorial control. In Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary
objections), the court began its analysis by recalling "that, although
Article 1 ... sets limits on the reach of the Convention, the concept of

'jurisdiction' under this provision is not restricted to the national
territory of the High Contracting Parties."'14 9 It then proceeded to
identify situations in which those outside of a state's territory could
still be deemed within the jurisdiction of that state.
The ECtHR first mentioned cases, such as Soering, in which the
extradition or expulsion of a person by a Contracting State could give
rise to a human rights violation "and hence engage the responsibility
of that State under the Convention.' 150 It should be noted, however,
that this is not an example of extraterritorial application as the
individual alleging a violation was actually within the territory of the

145.
240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 91 (1992) [hereinafter Drozd].
146.
Id.
147.
As noted above, the ECtHR at times conflates the issue of attribution with
the scope of beneficiaries; however, in principle these are distinct issues. Attribution is
concerned with the link between the relevant subject of human rights law (generally, a
state) and the individual (or entity) alleged to have perpetrated the violation of human
rights law (by engaging in conduct that unjustifiably interferes with human rights).
The scope of beneficiaries is concerned with the link between the relevant subject of
international law and the victim of the human rights violation. However, ascertaining
the existence and extent of the latter link may require the prior determination of an
issue of attribution. For example, to determine whether an individual is within a
state's jurisdiction, it may be necessary to determine whether those who are exercising
authority or control over those individuals are acting on behalf of that state.
148.

Id.

149.
310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
62 (1995) [hereinafter Loizidou (preliminary
objections)].
150.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A), 91 (1989).
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state, as the court subsequently recognized in the Bankovit case
151
discussed infra.
The court then identified a second category, recalling that the
"responsibility of Contracting Parties can be involved because of acts
of their authorities, whether performed within or outside national
boundaries, which produce effects outside their own territory."'152 The
court then set forth a third situation in which the Convention could
be found to apply extraterritorially:
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a
consequence of military action-whether lawful or unlawful-it
exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The
obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in
the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it be
exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate
153
local administration.

The court then noted that "the applicant's loss of control of her
property stems from the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by
Turkish troops" and that "it has not been disputed that the applicant
was prevented by Turkish troops from gaining access to her
property."' 154 The court found that "such acts are capable of falling
within Turkish 'jurisdiction' within the meaning of Article 1 ... of the
Convention."'155 In its judgment on the merits, the court found that
this extraterritorial jurisdiction had an extremely broad scope. The
court first found that the conduct of the TRNC was attributable to
Turkey. This finding enabled the court to view Turkish jurisdiction
as encompassing all "[t]hose affected by [the] policies or actions" of
156
the TRNC.
As noted above, in finding the conduct of the TRNC attributable
to Turkey, the court employed a somewhat lower standard than that
set forth in the ILC Articles. It was unclear at first whether this
lower standard was being employed solely to determine attribution
for the purpose of establishing Turkish jurisdiction over the territory
of northern Cyprus or whether attribution was being found in the
strict sense to hold that the conduct of the TRNC was conduct of
Turkey.
The subsequent case of Cyprus v. Turkey confirmed that the
ECtHR was referring to attribution in the strict sense. In that case,
the court noted that the responsibility of Turkey, "[h]aving effective

151.
152.
note 145).
153.
154.
155.
156.

See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
Loizidou (preliminary objections), supra note 149,
Id.
Id. 63.
Id. 64.
Loizidou (merits), supra note 42,

56.

62 (citing Drozd, supra
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cannot be confined to the

acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also
be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which
survives by virtue of Turkish military and other support." 15 7 This
approach enabled the court to find that "Turkey's 'jurisdiction' must
be considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive
rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which
she has ratified, and that violations of those rights are imputable to
Turkey." 158
In adopting this approach, the court essentially
assimilated the TRNC to an organ of the Turkish State and the
territory of northern Cyprus to Turkish territory for the purpose of
applying the Convention.
Although the ECtHR in the northern Cyprus cases focused its
attention on the issue of territorial control, this did not seem to
narrow in any way the other situations in which the European
human rights institutions had found the European Convention to
apply extraterritorially, in particular the exercise of authority
standard set forth in WM. v. Denmark. However, a subsequent,
highly politically-charged case seemed to diminish the scope of the
rule set forth by the European Commission in WM. v. Denmark. In
Bankovi, the court found that the applicants, relatives of individuals
killed in the course of the NATO bombing of Serbia, were not within
the jurisdiction of the respondent states. 159 In rejecting the
applicants' claims as being beyond the jurisdiction of Contracting
States, the court synthesized its prior holdings and set forth the
various situations in which it found the European Convention to
apply extraterritorially.
The court noted that the European Convention would apply to a
state's conduct abroad
when the . . . state, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory,
exercise[s] all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that
government. 160

157.
Cyprus, supra note 47, 77.
158.
Id.
159.
See generally Bankovi6, supranote 42.
160.
Id.
71. The court here seems to refer to two standards. The firsteffective control of territory-seems to be a reiteration of the rule expressed in the
northern Cyprus cases. The second seems intended to encompass a standard implicit
in Drozd. Had the conduct of the judges in that case been attributable to France or
Spain, it is likely that the court would have found the Convention to apply. Note
however, that the court in that case simply stated that the "responsibility [of
Contracting States] can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing
effects outside their own territory." Drozd, supra note 145,
91. Similarly, in
Loizidou, the court reiterated that the "responsibility of Contracting Parties can be
involved because of acts of their authorities, whether performed within or outside
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To these two situations-the exercise of public powers either through
effective control of territory or with consent-the court added "other
recognised instances of the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by
a state includ[ing] cases involving the activities of its diplomatic or
consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in,
161
or flying the flag of, that state."
The court did not restate the broad exercise of authority
standard of W.M v. Denmark. Presumably, the court intended W.M.
to be encompassed as a case "involving the activities of its diplomatic
or consular agents abroad." 16 2 However, this would seem to be a
narrower interpretation of the standard applied in that case. In
W.M, the European Commission found it clear that "that authorised
agents of a State, including diplomatic or consular agents, bring other
persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State to the extent
that they exercise authority over such persons or property." 16 3 This
seems to imply that it was not limited to acts of diplomatic or
consular agents.
The ECtHR expressly rejected the possibility, implicit in the
IACHR's Alejandre decision, that a Contracting State's jurisdiction
would follow the state's conduct, such that an infringement of rights
committed against anyone anywhere in the world (or at least within
the respective region) would be sufficient to bring that individual
within the state's jurisdiction for the purposes of applying its human
rights obligations. 164 The court noted that such an approach would
render "superfluous and devoid of any purpose" the Article 1
165
language "within their jurisdiction."'
Thus, the court seemed to significantly narrow the scope of
extraterritorial application of the European Convention. The exercise
of power and authority over persons would not be sufficient. The
court seemed to require territorial control (through military
occupation), the performance of a public function with the
permission 166 of the territorial state, or that the particular type of

national boundaries, which produce effects outside their own territory." Loizidou
(preliminary objections), supra note 149,
62 (citing Drozd, supra note 145). In
Bankovi, the court recasts this principle in narrower terms.
161.
Bankovie, supra note 42, 73.
162.
Id.
163.
W.M., supra note 144, 1 (emphasis added).
164.
Bankovi6, supra note 42, 75.
165.
Id.
166.
The court thus appeared to exclude conduct committed against the wishes
of the territorial state, unless imposed through military occupation of the territory.
This stands in stark contrast to the finding of the Human Rights Committee that the
expressed scope of article 2(1) "does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be
held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit
upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government
of that State or in opposition to it." Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay,
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jurisdiction exercised be recognized in international law (i.e., cases
involving diplomats or acts on vessels of the Contracting State).
Ultimately, the court found that none of the recognized
standards for extraterritorial application were applicable in
Bankovi6. 167 The NATO states were not in effective control of the
territory. Nor were they exercising a public power normally exercised
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with its permission. Finally,
their conduct was not recognized as an exercise of jurisdiction by any
other rule of international law.
However, the court's recent judgments show a more fluid
approach to extraterritorial application of the European Convention,
projecting a trend toward convergence (or re-convergence) with the
approach of the Human Rights Committee and IACHR. In Ila~cu v.
Moldova, the ECtHR was faced with an Application alleging breaches
of the Convention by both Moldova and Russia arising out of human
rights violations occurring in Transdniestria, a territory located
within the internationally recognized borders of Moldova but over
which Moldova had no effective control.i 6 8 Russia, however, was
alleged to have indirect control over the events occurring within the
territory.169 Most of the alleged human rights violations stemmed
from acts of authorities of the Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria
(MRT), a self-proclaimed government that is not recognized by the
international community.
In analyzing the responsibility of Moldova and Russia in relation
to the alleged violations, the court first had to determine whether the
victims came within their respective jurisdictions. In determining
the scope of Molodova's jurisdiction, the court began by recalling its
earlier jurisprudence on the concept of jurisdiction. It noted that
"jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the
State's territory."'170 It then found:
This presumption may be limited in exceptional circumstances,
particularly where a State is prevented from exercising its authority in
part of its territory. That may be as a result of military occupation by
the armed forces of another State which effectively controls the
territory concerned, to acts of war or rebellion, or to the acts of a foreign
State supporting the installation of a separatist State within the
territory of the State concerned. 171

To determine whether this was the case, the court would have to
"examine on the one hand all the objective facts capable of limiting

Communication No. R.12/52, at 176,
12.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) (1981)
(emphasis added).
167.
Bankovi6, supra note 42, 75.
168.
Ilaqcu, supra note 67, 3.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
312.
171.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the effective exercise of a State's authority over its territory, and on
the other the State's own conduct." 172 After recalling that the
"undertakings given by a Contracting State under Article 1 of the
Convention include, in addition to the duty to refrain from interfering
with enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed, positive
obligations,"'173 the court noted that these positive obligations "remain
even where the exercise of the State's authority is limited in part of
its territory, so that it has a duty to take all the appropriate measures
1 74
which it is still within its power to take."'
The court next summarized its earlier jurisprudence recognizing
that "in exceptional circumstances the acts of Contracting States
performed outside their territory or which produce effects there may
amount to exercise by them of their jurisdiction within the meaning
of Article 1 of the Convention."'1 75 It began with discussion of the
northern Cyprus cases, recalling the effective control of an area
standard, as well as the rules of attribution developed in those cases.
The court then referred to "acts which have sufficiently proximate
repercussions on rights guaranteed by the Convention, even if those
repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction," citing the example of
extradition to a state "where there are substantial grounds for
believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."' 1 76 At the same time, the court recalled established
rules of state responsibility, including the principles relating to ultra
vires conduct by state agents and the continuity of internationally
wrongful acts.
The court then, in a discussion that seems to blur the issue of
jurisdiction with the merits of the case, sought to determine "whether
Moldova's responsibility is engaged on account of either its duty to

172.
Id. 313.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id. 314.
176.
Id.
317. Interestingly, while the Bankovi court tried to place the
extradition cases outside the realm of extraterritorial application (by noting that the
individual being extradited was physically present within the territory of the relevant
Contracting State at the time of extradition), the court in I1a~cu placed them in the
context of "acts of Contracting States performed outside their territory or which
314. The court
produce effects there" amounting to exercises of "jurisdiction." Id.
also formulated more broadly the rule applicable to extradition cases, stating, "A
State's responsibility may also be engaged on account of acts which have sufficiently
proximate repercussions on rights guaranteed by the Convention, even if those
317. This broad formulation of the
repercussions occur outside its jurisdiction." Id.
rule does not rely on the physical presence of the victim within the state's territory,
and extradition is cited as just one example of application of this rule. This is one of
many signals in Ila~cu that the court was attempting to back away from the rigidity of
its Bankovid decision.
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refrain from wrongful conduct or its positive obligations under the
Convention. '177 The court noted that
even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian region,
Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention
to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in
its power to take and are in accordance with international law to secure
1 78
to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.

After discussion of the concept of positive obligations, the court
conclude[d] that the applicants [were] within the jurisdiction of the
Republic of Moldova for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention but
that its responsibility for the acts complained of, committed in the
territory of the "MRT," over which it exercises no effective authority, is
to be assessed in the light of its positive obligations under the
Convention. 179

The ECtHR then analyzed the relevant conduct of the Moldovan
government and further concluded that "Moldova's responsibility is
capable of being engaged under the Convention on account of its
failure to discharge its positive obligations with regard to the acts
complained of which occurred after May 2001."180 The court then
considered whether the applicants "come within the jurisdiction of
the Russian Federation." 18 1 It began by examining the events in
Transdniestria prior to Russia's ratification of the ECtHR. After
analyzing the link between the Russian Federation and the MRT, the
court found that the "Russian Federation's responsibility is engaged
in respect of the unlawful acts committed by the Transdniestrian
separatists, regard being had to the military and political support it
gave them to help them set up the separatist regime and the
18 2
participation of its military personnel in the fighting."
Noting that Russian soldiers participated in the initial arrest
and detention of the applicants within Transdniestria,1 8 3 the court
found that "on account of the above events the applicants came within
the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Convention, although at the time when they occurred

177.

Id.

322.

178.
Id.
331.
179.
Id.
335. This, of course, is not an example of extraterritorial application
since the victims were within the territory of Moldova; however, it is relevant to the
court's jurisprudence on extraterritoriality.
180.
Id. 352.
181.
Id.
376. Interestingly, the court then rephrased its inquiry, stating that
"the Court's task is to determine whether ... the Russian Federation can be held
responsible for the alleged violations." Id.
377. The court here blurs the issue of
responsibility with the issues of attribution as well as the scope of the state's
jurisdiction. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
182.
l7acu, supra note 67, 382.

183.

Id. 383.
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the Convention was not in force with regard
Federation."'18 4 The court continued, explaining:

to the Russian

This is because the events which gave rise to the responsibility of the
Russian Federation must be considered to include not only the acts in
which the agents of that State participated, like the applicants' arrest
and detention, but also their transfer into the hands of the
Transdniestrian police and regime, and the subsequent ill-treatment
inflicted on them by those police, since in acting in that way the agents
of the Russian Federation were fully aware that they were handing
185
them over to an illegal and unconstitutional regime.

In a somewhat circular analysis, the court here referred to the
responsibility of the Russian Federation, and implied that it is this
responsibility l86 that brings the applicants within the jurisdiction of
the Russian Federation. The court then stated, "In addition, regard
being had to the acts the applicants were accused of, the agents of the
Russian Government knew, or at least should have known, the fate
which awaited them."' 8 7 Thus, the court seems to supplement its
finding of responsibility with a Soering-type analysis, even though
unlike Soering, the applicants were not on Russian territory.' 8 8
The court seems to indicate that the complicity of Russian agents
in acts of the MRT authorities rendered the conduct of those
authorities attributable to Russia, opining that "all of the acts
committed by Russian soldiers with regard to the applicants,
including their transfer into the charge of the separatist regime, in
the context of the Russian authorities' collaboration with that illegal
regime, are capable of engaging responsibility for the acts of that
regime."'18 9 Since this conduct was all pre-ratification, the court then
queried "whether that responsibility remained engaged and whether

184.
Id. T 384.
185.
Id.
186.
It is unclear whether in using the term responsibility the court is referring
to responsibility under the Convention or to the analytically distinct issue of
attribution of conduct. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. If the former, then
the court's formulation is truly circular. If the latter, then the court seems to imply
that attribution to the state of human rights violative conduct is sufficient to bring the
victims within the jurisdiction of that state for purposes of applying the Convention.
This would be in direct contradiction with Bankovi6. However, the court may implicitly
be relying on the control over Transdniestrian territory exercised by the MRT, the
conduct of which is attributable to the Russian Federation. This would align the
present case more closely with the northern Cyprus line of cases. However, in that
case, it was the control of the territory by Turkish forces that rendered the conduct of
the TRNC attributable to Turkey.
187.
Ila.cu, supra note 67, 384.
See Soering, supra note 150.
188.
189.
Id. 1 385. Again, the phrase "capable of engaging responsibility for the acts
of that regime" seems to indicate that the conduct of that regime is attributable to the
Russian Federation. However, the court's formulation makes this unclear.
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it was still engaged at the time of the ratification of the Convention
by the Russian Federation."'1 9
The court examined the continuing links between Russia and the

MRT, and concluded,
All of the above proves that the "MRT," set up in 1991-1992 with the
support of the Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and its
own administration, remains under the effective authority, or at the
very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation, and
in any event that it survives by virtue of the military, economic,
191
financial and political support given to it by the Russian Federation.

In referring to the MRT, the court appears to refer to the regime, as
opposed to the territory.192 Thus, the court seems to have found that
the MRT, as an administration, was under the effective authority of
the Russian Federation.
That being the case, the court found that there was
a continuous and uninterrupted link of responsibility on the part of the
Russian Federation for the applicants' fate, as the Russian Federation's
policy of support for the regime and collaboration with it continued
beyond 5 May 1998, and after that date the Russian Federation made
no attempt to put an end to the applicants' situation brought about by
its agents, and did not act to prevent the violations allegedly committed
after 5 May 1998.193

In light of this continuous link of responsibility, the court concluded
that "the applicants therefore come within the 'jurisdiction' of the
Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention
and its responsibility is engaged with regard to the acts complained
19 4
of."

Significantly, nowhere did the ECtHR find that the Russian
Federation was in overall control of the territory of Transdniestria.

190.
Id.
191.
Id.
392. Here the court seems to employ an even lower standard"decisive influence" or dependence ("survives by virtue of')-for attribution. Given the
court's reference earlier in its judgment to the continuity of internationally wrongful
acts, the court may believe that applying a lower standard for attribution in this
context is warranted. However, the rules referred to by the court in its discussion of
the continuity of internationally wrongful acts pre-suppose an initial breach. In this
instance, the pre-ratification conduct of the Russian Federation cannot constitute a
breach of the Convention. Thus, the standard for continuity of an existing violation is
inapplicable. Also, use of the phrase "survives by virtue of' Russian support parallels
language used by the court in Cyprus in finding the conduct of the TRNC attributable
to Turkey. However, in that case, the finding of attribution was based primarily on
Turkey's overall control of the territory of northern Cyprus. Cyprus, supra note 42,

77.
192.
The court appears to use the term "MRT' to refer alternatively to the
territory of Transdniestria as well as to the separatist regime.
193.
Ilacu, supra note 67, 393.
194.
Id. 394.
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However, using rules of attribution of its own design, 195 it seems to
have attributed the conduct of the MRT authorities to the Russian
Federation. Once it had assimilated the MRT regime to an organ of
the Russian Federation, it could then be argued that the Russian
Federation was in fact in overall control of Transdniestria via the
MRT authorities. However, this is not explicitly mentioned by the
court. Further, this is the inverse of its findings in the northern
Cyprus cases. While the Ilaqcu court cited its earlier jurisprudence
relating to Turkey's responsibility in northern Cyprus, it neglected to
point out that in that case, the conduct of the TRNC was initially
found attributable to Turkey because of Turkey's effective overall
control of the territory. All of the subsequent findings of attribution
stemmed from this original finding. Absent reliance on a territorial
control argument, the Ilaqcu court seems to reduce its jurisdiction
inquiry to the simple question of whether alleged infringements were
attributable to the Russian Federation. In so doing, the court seems
to have adopted a much lower standard than those set forth in
Bankovi6.
This trend in favor of more relaxed standards for extraterritorial
application is also seen in the more recent case of Issa v. Turkey. In
this case concerning the conduct of Turkish forces in northern Iraq,
the ECtHR again listed situations in which the European Convention
would apply extraterritorially. 196 In addition to the effective overall
control standard of the northern Cyprus cases, the court seemed to
resurrect the power and authority standard. Citing the Commission's
decision in W.M. v. Denmark, it stated, "a State may also be held
accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of
persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to
be under the former State's authority and control through its agents
19 7
operating-whether lawfully or unlawfully-in the latter State."
The court implied that this rule had been a consistent part of it
jurisprudence, but that would seem not to be the case. 198 Of the

195.
While the court purports to rely on the established Law of State
Responsibility in formulating its rules of attribution, it in fact departs from those rules
significantly.
Issa v. Turkey, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 629, 68-71 [hereinafter Issa].
196.
197.
Id. 71.
198.
One of the reasons for the apparent inconsistencies in the court's
jurisprudence may be the different ways in which the court has formulated the
question of whether extraterritorial conduct of the state has fallen within the scope of
Article 1. While the text of Article 1 requires Contracting States to secure rights "to
everyone within their jurisdiction," the court has framed the question in a variety of
ways. European Convention, supra note 8. The court variably refers to individuals,
acts, matters, or property being within the jurisdiction of the particular state. At other
times, the court frames the question exclusively as one of attribution without clearly
explaining the relationship between attribution and the separate question of whether
individuals fall within the jurisdiction of the state.

1492

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 39.1447

various cases cited for this standard, none are the court's own
cases. 199 Indeed, the Issa court cited cases of the IACHR and Human
Rights Committee from which the court had distanced itself in
Bankovi6, and the court even adopted the reasoning of the Human
Rights Committee in Lopez, stating, "[a]ccountability in such
situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot
be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of
the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not
'200
perpetrate on its own territory.
While this is a welcome development in the evolution of a
coherent jurisprudence, it begs the question of the continued
necessity of territorial control. If the exercise of power and authority
over individuals is sufficient to find those individuals within the
jurisdiction of the Contracting State, then.it would seem nonsensical
to retain the higher standard of effective control over territory.
Presumably, anyone within territory under the effective control of a
state would also be under that state's power and authority. Thus,
after Issa, it would appear that the distinctions among the various
standards cited by the ECtHR over the past decade have lost much of
their significance in the context of determining whether individuals
may fall within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State. However,
these distinctions may still be relevant in determining other
dimensions of the scope of that Contracting State's obligation as
explained below in Sections C and D.
c.

Regionality

One element in particular of the ECtHR's jurisprudence
warrants closer inspection. In the Bankovi6 case, the court noted
that "the Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the
world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States. 2 0° 1 It
found that "the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating ... in
an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace
juridique) of the Contracting States. 20°2 As the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia was not a party to the Convention, it did not comprise
part of this legal space.
Essentially, the court found that the European human rights
system was designed within and for a particular region and was not
intended to make Council of Europe States responsible for securing

199.

It does, however, cite Commission cases, including W.M., supra note 144,

1.
200.
Issa, supra note 196, 71. This formulation is almost identical to that used
by the Human Rights Committee in Lopez, which the Court had criticized in Bankovie.

201.

Bankovid, supra note 42,

202.

Id.

80.
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the rights of individuals throughout the world. 20 3 This reasoning
would of course only apply to regional human rights obligations and
would not be relevant to obligations arising under treaties open for
universal participation, such as the ICCPR and ICESCR. However,
even within the context of regional obligations, the continuing vitality
of the legal space argument is questionable.
A number of considerations support a finding that regional
human rights obligations do apply to a state's conduct beyond
regional frontiers. Chief among these is the notion of universality.
The very idea of human rights supports a finding that they would
apply vis-A-vis all human beings. Although regional human rights
norms are generated and formulated within a regional framework,
they purport to be universally applicable. 20 4 As such, the focus of
human rights law generally is on how states ought to behave with
respect to any human being under their control. Thus, it is clearly
established in the jurisprudence of all regional human rights bodies
that human rights obligations apply irrespective of the nationality of
the victim. As the Inter-American Commission has noted in a case
involving extraterritorial conduct, "[g]iven that individual rights
inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity, each American State
is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its
205
jurisdiction."
The regional nature of the treaty speaks not to the scope of
beneficiaries but to the willingness of states within the region to
agree to a particular treaty regime and system of collective
enforcement. As expressed in the preamble of the European
Convention, "the governments of European countries which are likeminded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedom and the rule of law, [were resolved] to take the first steps for
the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the
'20 6
Universal Declaration.
Finally, the ECtHR's jurisprudence is itself in flux with respect
to this issue. The court has diminished the force of its legal space

203.
Id.
204.
The Preamble to the European Convention makes clear that the standards
enunciated in that treaty are derived from the Universal Declaration and reaffirms the
"profound belief [of the Contracting States] in those fundamental freedoms which are
the foundation of justice and peace in the world," not just the region. European
Convention, supra note 8. (emphasis added).
The Preamble of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man similarly employs the language of
universality, asserting that "[aill men are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights."
Ninth Int'l Conference of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, (Bogota, Colombia, 1948), available at
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
205.
Coard, supranote 12, 37; see also Alejandre, supra note 132, 23.
206.
European Convention, supra note 8, at pmbl.

1494

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:1447

argument. In Issa, the court found that Turkish troops had been
carrying out cross-border military operations "aimed at pursuing and
'20 7
eliminating terrorists who were seeking shelter in northern Iraq.
The court noted that if Turkey "could be considered to have exercised,
temporarily, effective overall control of a particular portion of the
territory of northern Iraq" and if it could be shown that "at the
relevant time, the victims were within that specific area," then "it
would follow logically that they were within the jurisdiction of Turkey
(and not that of Iraq, which is not a Contracting State and clearly
does not fall within the legal space (espace juridique) of the
Contracting States. '20 8 The court essentially equated being within
the jurisdiction of Turkey with being within the legal space of the
Contracting States for the purpose of applying the Convention. This
could be interpreted as relegating the legal space argument to
circularity, at least in situations where Contracting States exercise a
degree of territorial control.
3.

Customary Human Rights Law

Finally, this limitation of scope may not apply with respect to
those human rights norms that have evolved into customary
international law. Thus, all states may be bound by these norms in
their dealings with anyone anywhere. The U.S. JAG Operational
Law Handbook, for example, provides that the customary law of
20 9
human rights applies to U.S. armed forces wherever they may act.
C. Range of Rights Applicable
Under human rights treaties, the range of rights applicable
within a state's territory will normally be the full range of rights set
forth in each treaty. However, this may not be the case when the
state is operating abroad. In such situations, the range of applicable
rights may be limited by the scope of the state's authority or control
in the circumstances. In general, it may be reasoned that as human
rights law is generally predicated on a state's authority and

207.
208.

Issa, supra note 196,
Id.
74.

73.

209.
INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'s LEGAL CTR.
& SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 45 (2005) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] ("Human

rights law established by treaty generally only binds the state in relation to persons
under its jurisdiction; human rights law based on customary international law binds
all states, in all circumstances."). It should be noted, however, that the United States
rejects extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. John Cerone, Out of Bounds?
Considering the Reach of International Human Rights Law 4 (Center for Human
Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No. 5, 2006), available at http://www.nyuhr.
org/docsNWPSNYUCHRGJCeroneFinal.pdf.
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presumed capacity to control individuals and territories, 210 a state's
human rights obligations while acting abroad would not be as
extensive as when it acts on its own territory. Similarly, it may be
the case that the application of certain rights requires a higher
threshold of control.
As noted above, the ICJ in its Israeli Wall Opinion appeared to
establish different thresholds of application for the International
Covenants. While the exercise of jurisdiction was sufficient for
application of the ICCPR, the ICJ explicitly required territorial
control to trigger application of the ICESCR.2 11 After noting that
Article 2 of the ICESCR does not contain a provision circumscribing
the scope of States Parties' obligations, the ICJ acknowledged that
the rights enumerated therein are "essentially territorial." 212
Nonetheless, the court found that "it is not to be excluded that it
applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty
and to those over which that State exercises territorial
jurisdiction. '2 13 Here the court appears to limit more narrowly the
circumstances in which the ICESCR would apply extraterritorially.
Rather than referring simply to the exercise of jurisdiction, the court
seems to require the exercise of territorial jurisdiction, which implies
control over territory and not just over individuals.
It may be that this approach is linked to the nature of economic
and social rights. In general, these rights are thought to require an
expansive and more highly defined conception of the state. In
situations of extraterritorial conduct, this conception is not
necessarily applicable-the full apparatus of the state is not readily
available, nor is the level of control as great as that exercised by a
state within its own territory. However, in Congo v. Uganda, the
court seemed to indicate a single standard for the extraterritorial
application of human rights treaties generally.
It stated that
"internationalhuman rights instruments are applicable 'in respect of
acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction."'' 2 14 It then
appeared to employ this standard in finding applicable the ICCPR,
the CRC and its Optional Protocol, and the ACHPR. While both the
ACHPR and CRC contain economic and social rights, there was no
separate analysis of the scope of application of these instruments.
At the same time, however, the court found these instruments
applicable "as relevant. '2 15 This might simply mean that only those
provisions setting forth rights actually infringed by acts of the

210.

Bankovi6, supra note 42,

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Legal Consequences, supra note 15, 7 108-12.
Id. 112.
Id.
Armed Activities, supra note 110, 216.
Id. 217.

80.
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Ugandan forces would be applicable. However, such an approach
would fail to take account of positive obligations, particularly in the
economic and social spheres as will be discussed below. Alternatively,
"as relevant" might indicate that some provisions of these treaties
require a greater finding of control or more expansive exercise of
jurisdiction than others. Ultimately, the court made no mention of the
economic and social rights enumerated in the ACHPR or CRC 216 and
only found violations of provisions concerning the right to life, liberty,
and security of person and the protection of children in times of
217
armed conflict.
Although the regional institutions provide little express guidance
on this issue, the European institutions have indicated that the
exercise of certain rights may be linked to territorial control and have
implied that such rights may not apply in situations falling short of
territorial control. Thus, in WM. v. Denmark, in response to the
applicant's allegations that he was deprived of his right to move
freely on Danish territory and that he was expelled without a decision
being taken in accordance with law, the European Commission
observed that
[A]lithough... a State party to the Convention may be held responsible
either directly or indirectly for acts committed by its diplomatic agents,
the provisions invoked by the applicant must be interpreted in the light
of the special circumstances which prevail in situations as the one
218
which is at issue in the present case.

Noting that "the applicant, while the incident took place, was not on
Danish territory," the Commission held that "the provisions invoked
219
by him are not applicable to his case."
In Cyprus v. Turkey, where the ECtHR found that Turkey had
territorial control over northern Cyprus, the court found the full
range of European Convention rights to be applicable. After finding
that Turkey, by virtue of its effective overall control of northern
Cyprus, was responsible for the conduct of the local authorities there
(i.e., the TRNC), the court held: "It follows that, in terms of Article 1
of the Convention, Turkey's 'jurisdiction' must be considered to
extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in
the Convention and those additional Protocols which she has
ratified. '2 20 This seems to imply that in situations falling short of
effective overall control, Contracting States may be bound to observe
a narrower range of rights.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

The court did not include the ICESCR in its list of applicable treaties.
Id.
W.M., supra note 144, 2.
Id.
Cyprus, supra note 47, 77.
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More generally, the jurisprudence of regional institutions seems
to indicate that the scope of a state's obligations vary with the scope
of the authority and control exercised. In WM v. Denmark, the
European Commission found it clear from the constant jurisprudence
of the Commission that authorized agents of a state, including
diplomatic or consular agents, bring other persons or property within
the jurisdiction of that state to the extent that they exercise authority
over such persons or property. In so far as they affect such persons or
property by their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the state is
221
engaged.
This seems to imply that a state's exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction has a variable scope. Similarly, the ECtHR, in
formulating the question of whether extraterritorial conduct of the
state has fallen within the scope of Article 1, has variously referred to
individuals, acts, matters, or property being within the jurisdiction of
the particular state. 222 It seems then that individuals may come
within a state's jurisdiction to various degrees. For example, where a
state brings an individual into its jurisdiction through a particular
act, without having control generally over that individual or over the
territory within which that individual may be found, it would seem
that the individual is within the jurisdiction of that state only for the
purpose of that act.
As these institutions have linked their findings of jurisdiction to
the scope of a state's authority and control over people or territory, it
may thus be argued that the range of rights states are bound to
respect is dependent upon the level of that state's control. 223

221.
W.M., supra note 144, 1.
222.
See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
223.
This also seems to be the case with respect to customary human rights law.
In general, customary law recognizes a narrower range of rights than that provided
under treaty law. Further, the extraterritorial application of customary human rights
law may be subject to limitations analogous to those applicable to human rights
treaties. For example, the U.S. Judge Advocate General's Handbook noted that when
the United States carried out detention operations in Haiti as part of Operation Uphold
Democracy, U.S. forces complied with the customary human rights norms implicated
by that operation, including freedom from arbitrary detention. HANDBOOK, supra note
209, at 49.
Along this line, the Joint Task Force (JTF) lawyers first noted that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not prohibit detention or arrest,
but simply protects civilians from the arbitrary application of these forms of
liberty denial. The JTF could detain civilians who posed a legitimate threat to
the force, its mission, or other Haitian civilians.
The Handbook notes that detainees were also "entitled to a baseline of humanitarian
and due process protections," including "the provision of a clean and safe holding area;
rules and conduct that would prevent any form of physical maltreatment, degrading
treatment, or intimidation; and rapid judicial review of their individual detention." Id.
at 50. The United States did not, however, "step into the shoes of the Haitian
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Nonetheless, the ECtHR appeared to dismiss this possibility in
Bankovi6, flatly rejecting the applicants' "claim that the positive
obligation under Article 1 extends to securing the Convention rights
in a manner proportionate to the level of control exercised in any
given extra-territorial situation. '224 The court stated its view that
the wording of Article 1 does not provide any support for the applicants'
suggestion that the positive obligation in Article 1 to secure "the rights
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention" can be divided
and tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of the
extra-territorial act in question.... 225

This position seems difficult to reconcile with the notion that a
state's exercise of jurisdiction may be limited to a narrow scope.
Indeed, in the court's later jurisprudence, it seems to back away from
the rigidity of this statement. 226 However, another approach is to
focus the inquiry not on the question of which rights the state is
obliged to secure, but instead on the level of obligation upon states
with respect to those rights, as discussed below.
D. Level of Obligation
As noted above, the obligation to respect and ensure rights, or in
the words of the European Convention, to secure rights, entails a
substantial degree of positive obligation. 227 As with the range of
rights, the level of obligation may also be limited where the state
operates abroad. The level of obligation may similarly be tied to the
scope of a state's extraterritorial activities or authority to act. In
particular, it is arguable that human rights obligations requiring the
adoption of affirmative measures may be more limited in an
extraterritorial context. This position finds support in the
international jurisprudence cited above. In the Israeli Wall Opinion,
the ICJ found that the ICCPR "is applicable in respect of acts done by
'228
a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.
While the Human Rights Committee had referred to "conduct by the
State party's authorities," the ICJ used the phrase "acts done by a
State. ' 229 This difference in terminology may have some significance.

government, and did nt become a guarantor of all the rights that international law
requires a government to provide its own nationals." Id. at 49. As the United States
rejects extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, the Handbook refers here
solely to customary law.
Bankovi6, supra note 42, 75.
224.
225.
Id. T 76.
226.
See, e.g., Ila~cu, supra note 67.
227.
See supra Part III (indicating that customary international law may entail
a lower level of obligation).
228.
Legal Consequences, supra note 15, 111.
229.
Id.
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230
While the term conduct encompasses both actions and omissions,
the term acts may be read to preclude the latter. Under this
interpretation, only negative obligations would be applicable to
Israel's conduct.
As to the scope of obligation imposed on Israel by the ICESCR in
the occupied territories, the court found "[i]n the exercise of the
powers available to it [as the occupying Power], Israel is bound by the
provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights." 231 Thus, the scope of its obligation under the
ICESCR may be co-extensive with the scope of its authority as an
occupying power. The court noted further that Israel "is under an
obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in
those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian
authorities." 232 Thus, with respect to matters within the scope of
Palestinian authority, the court implied that Israel is bound only by
negative obligations. This would seem to imply, a contrario,that the
scope of Israel's obligation in matters within its authority, and
beyond the authority of the Palestinians, encompasses positive
obligations. This would seem to indicate that as Israel cedes control,
the scope of its obligation is decreased from one encompassing
positive and negative obligations to one entailing only negative
obligations. Ultimately, however, the court analyzed Israel's conduct
exclusively in the context of negative obligations, finding that "the
construction of the wall and its associated r6gime impede" the
exercise of a number of rights under both Covenants.23 3 Nonetheless,
the ICJ's language setting forth the applicable law was broad enough
to accommodate positive obligations in principle, at least in the
context of occupation.
In Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ seemed to take a different
approach, and this shift in approach is related to the two bases upon
which the court found human rights law applicable to Uganda's
conduct in the DRC. In restating the "exercise of its jurisdiction" rule
from the Israeli Wall Opinion, the court again referred to acts as
opposed to conduct. However, in finding human rights law
incorporated into the law of occupation, the court clearly
contemplated the possibility of culpable omission. In particular, the
court found that "Uganda's responsibility is engaged both for any acts
of its military that violated its international obligations and for any
lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law by other actors present in the

230.
231.
232.
233.

Responsibility of States, supra note 21, at art. 2.
Legal Consequences, supra note 15, 112.
Id.
Id. 134.
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occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own
account. '23 4 This language clearly asserts the existence of a positive
obligation on Uganda to act with vigilance to prevent human rights
violations committed by third parties. 23 5 However, what is unclear is
whether this positive obligation is entailed by norms of human rights
law themselves or by the application of Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, through which the norms of human rights law are
applicable. In any event, as the court found Article 43 to have
acquired the status of customary law, 23 6 it will make little difference
in situations of occupation whether the positive obligation results
directly from the norms of human rights law or whether it arises by
operation of the rule contained in Article 43.
However, in
extraterritorial situations falling short of occupation, the degree of
positive obligation entailed by human rights law, if any, remains
unclear.
Again, the court's finding that the ICCPR, CRC, and ACHPR are
applicable "as relevant" compounds this ambiguity. Ultimately, the
court simply concluded, without any significant analysis, that certain
provisions of these instruments had been violated. 237 Thus, it
remains unclear whether certain rights provided for in these treaties
were simply not relevant to the facts of this case or whether the
positive dimension of the obligation to ensure those rights was
inapplicable in this particular context.
A similar analysis may be applied to the jurisprudence of
regional institutions. In Alejandre, the IACHR recalled that "when
agents of a state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and
authority over persons outside national territory, the state's
obligation to respect human rights continues .... ,"238 Again, it is
worth noting that the Commission referred only to the obligation to
respect rights; it did not mention the obligation to ensure rights. It
may be that this was not intended to imply that Cuba would be
limited to negative obligations. However, to date the Commission's
finding of extraterritorial application of human rights obligations has
been limited to finding violations of negative obligations. It is unclear
whether the same analysis would apply to positive obligations.
The ECtHR seems to admit the possibility that a state's
obligations may encompass positive obligations in an extraterritorial

234.
Armed Activities, supranote 110, 179.
235.
Similarly, in summarizing its findings of fact, the court enumerated acts of
the UPDF as.well as omissions (e.g., UPDF troops "took no steps to put an end to such
conflicts" and "did not take measures to ensure respect for human rights and
international humanitarian law .. .").Id. 211. However, the indicated omissions
occurred in areas where Uganda was found to have been an occupying power.
236.
Id.
217.
237.
Id.
219.
238.
Alejandre, supra note 132, 25.
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context, at least in situations of territorial control. In Cyprus v.
Turkey, the ECtHR noted that since Turkey had effective control over
the territory of northern Cyprus,
its responsibility could not be confined to the acts of its own agents
therein but was engaged by the acts of the local administration which
survived by virtue of Turkish support. Turkey's "jurisdiction" under
Article 1 was therefore considered to extend to securing the entire
239
range of substantive Convention rights in northern Cyprus.

In using the term securing instead of respecting, the court may have
implied that positive obligations were entailed. While the European
Convention does not use the term respect in Article 1, it could have
employed this term as it is used by other human rights bodies if it
wished to limit the scope of obligation to negative duties. The court
then addressed the question of whether Turkey was required to
protect rights from private interference in northern Cyprus. It
determined that it would address this issue on a case by case basis in
light of the violation alleged.2 40 In analyzing alleged violations by
third parties, the court found that Turkey's responsibility would be
engaged if the applicant could establish a "policy of acquiescing" on
the part of the TRNC. 24 1 It would thus appear that a mere failure to
respond to perpetration of violations by non-state actors would be
insufficient to trigger responsibility. The omission would be culpable
only if it were pursuant to a policy of acquiescence. This approach
blurs the distinction between negative and positive obligations.
In W.M. v. Denmark, as noted above, the European Commission
seemed to admit the possibility of a variable scope of obligation, and
this could be interpreted to apply to the degree of positive obligation
entailed. In that case, the applicant contended that Denmark bore
responsibility for human rights violations perpetrated by DDR police
because the Danish Ambassador had summoned the police who
arrested the applicant. 242 In analyzing the responsibility of Denmark
in relation to human rights violations perpetrated by the DDR
authorities, the court recalled "that an act or omission of a Party to
the Convention may exceptionally engage the responsibility of that
State for acts of a State not party to the Convention where the person
in question had suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of the
2 43
guarantees and rights secured to him under the Convention,"
citing the Soering case. The Commission found, however, "that what
happened to the applicant at the hands of the DDR authorities cannot

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Bankovi6, supranote 42, 70 (interpreting the court's findings in Cyprus).
Cyprus, supra note 47, 98.
Id. 346.
W.M., supra note 144, 1.
Id.
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in the circumstances be considered to be so exceptional as to engage
the responsibility of Denmark. ' 244 Clearly, the Commission was of the
view that the Danish Ambassador was under no positive obligation in
these circumstances to protect the applicant from the DDR
authorities. Indeed, it seems Denmark was similarly free of any
negative obligation to refrain from handing him over to the police.
However, in Bankovi6, the ECtHR seemed to reject the
possibility of varying levels of obligation. Again, the court rejected the
applicants' claim that the scope of a Contracting State's obligation
was proportionate to its degree of control, asserting that "the
applicants' submission is tantamount to arguing that anyone
adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State,
wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its
consequences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that
State for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention. ' 245 The court
dismissed this possibility.
Essentially, the Bankovi6 court seemed to take an all-or-nothing
view of application of the Convention. In particular, the court
expressed the view that "the scope of Article 1, at issue in the present
case, is determinative of the very scope of the Contracting Parties'
positive obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the entire
Convention system of human rights' protection .... 1246 It emphasized
that
the wording of Article 1 does not provide any support for the applicants'
suggestion that the positive obligation in Article 1 to secure "the rights
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention" can be divided
and tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of the
extra-territorial act in question .... 247

As phrased by the court, this proposition does indeed seem
unreasonable. To hold states responsible for extraterritorial
consequences of their conduct that were neither intended nor
foreseeable seems both unworkable and unrealistic, particularly in
the context of positive obligations. But it certainly would not be
unreasonable to admit the possibility of world-wide application of the
Convention where a state was the direct perpetrator of an intentional
human rights violation.
As noted above, the ECtHR's subsequent jurisprudence seems to
indicate that Bankovi was anomalous. In Ilaqcu, for example, the
ECtHR found that Moldova's jurisdiction had a more limited scope by
virtue of the fact that it did not have effective control over part of its
territory. Here, the court expressly tied the scope of Moldova's

244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Bankovi6, supra note 42, 1 75.
Id.
65.
Id.
75.
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jurisdiction to the level of Moldova's control over the situation facing
the applicants. Where a Contracting State is prevented from
exercising its authority over its territory "by a constraining de facto
situation," the court held that "such a factual situation reduces the
scope of that jurisdiction in that the undertaking given by the State
under Article 1 must be considered only in the light of the
Contracting State's positive obligations towards persons within its
territory." 248 Before concluding that "Moldova's responsibility is
capable of being engaged under the Convention,"' 249 the court had
satisfied itself that "it was within the power of the Moldovan
Government to take measures to secure to the applicants their rights
under the Convention. '250 The court thus appears to link the scope of
251
Moldova's jurisdiction and responsibility, which it blurs together,

248.
Ilacu, supra note 67, 333 (emphasis added). The court seems to find that
only positive obligations are applicable to Moldova in this context. However, it may be
that the court has implicitly determined that negative obligations may be applicable
but are simply not implicated by Moldova's conduct.
249.
Id.
352.
250.
Id. 7 351. Note, however, that this blurs the question of jurisdiction with
that of responsibility.
251.
The court's confusion becomes complete in Ilacu. Its consistent conflation
of jurisdiction and responsibility poses a dilemma for the court in analyzing the claims
against Moldova. The applicants, physically situated within Moldovan territory, were
clearly within Moldova's jurisdiction. However, the court's conflation of jurisdiction
with responsibility means that the court could not find that the applicants were within
Moldovan jurisdiction without also finding that the matters complained of are
"imputable" to Moldova, meaning either that the violations are attributable to Moldova
or that Moldova has positive obligations in relation to those violations. The court thus
set about determining the scope of Moldova's positive obligations in this context. It
would be much clearer analytically if the court had found that the applicants were
within Moldova's jurisdiction. The court could then deal separately, at a later stage of
its analysis, with the question of whether Moldova was responsible for a violation of
the Convention. In that later analysis, the court could easily find that the acts of the
MRT authorities, which are not organs of the Moldovan government, are not
attributable to Moldova. This would leave only Moldova's positive obligations, which
could then be assessed in light of the prevailing circumstances in Transdniestria.
In determining whether applicants were within the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation, the court phrased the question as: "In the present case the Court's task is
to determine whether . . . the Russian Federation can be held responsible for the
alleged violations," again conflating responsibility and jurisdiction. Id. 7 277. The
court proceeded to find the conduct of the MRT attributable to the Russian Federation
and then used this finding to expand Russia's jurisdiction. Id. 7 464, 494. By relying
on its prior blurring of the distinction between attribution and responsibility, the court
was able to employ a lower standard for attribution. In the northern Cyprus cases, the
court based attribution of the conduct of the TRNC to Turkey on the fact that Turkey
exercised effective overall control of that part of the island. Cyprus, supra note 47, 7
56. While the court in that cased referred to the fact that the TRNC depended on
Turkey for its survival, this alone was not sufficient for its conduct to be attributed to
Turkey. In recalling the standards developed in those cases, the court noted: "the
acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of
private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its
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to the scope of Moldova's control over the territory and the situation.
While this would not be an example of extraterritorial application, as
Transdniestria is part of Moldovan territory, the ECtHR's approach
in Ilaqcu is in tension with the finding in Bankovi6 that the Article 1
obligation of Contracting States cannot be subdivided and tailored to
particular circumstances.
Also noteworthy is the repeated reference of the Ilaqcu court to
Moldova's positive obligation(s) 252 under Article 1 toward persons
"within its territory." In other cases, the court has not been so careful
to include the latter phrase. It may be that the court here was
indicating that positive obligations are generally not applicable
extraterritorially, except perhaps in those cases where an area can be
assimilated to the territory of another state, such as in northern
Cyprus, where the court suggested that Turkey's obligations under
253
the Convention may entail a positive dimension.
In the Issa case, in support of its inclusion of the power and
authority standard, the ECtHR stated, "[a]ccountability in such
situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot
be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of
the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not
perpetrate on its own territory."2 54 As with the Israeli Wall Opinion
and the Alejandre case, the word employed by the court implies a
context of violation of a negative obligation. Here, the court referred
to perpetration, which could be read as encompassing only
affirmative interference with rights, as opposed to a failure to adopt
positive measures of protection. While this use of language may not
have been. intentional, it fits a pattern among human rights bodies of
employing the language of negative obligations when finding
extraterritorial application based on a standard of power, authority,
or control over individuals (and not over territory).

jurisdiction may engage the State's responsibility under the Convention." Id.
81.
The court continued, "[tihat is particularly true in the case of recognition by the State
in question of the acts of self-proclaimed authorities which are not recognized by the
international community." lla.cu, supra note 67,
318. It should be recalled,
however, that the "acquiescence or connivance" standard was employed by the Cyprus
court not in finding the TRNC's conduct attributable to Turkey, but rather in
determining whether Turkey bore responsibility in relation to the human rights
violations committed by private individuals in northern Cyprus. The Ila~cu court
appeared to base its finding of attribution on the complicity of Russian soldiers, the
military and political support provided by the Russian Federation, and the dependence
of the MRT regime on this Russian support. Id.
63. Thus, the court in Ila~cu, while
purporting to rely on established jurisprudence, in fact adopted a lower standard for
attribution.
252.
The court appears to alternate between the single and plural forms of
"obligation." Ilaqcu, supra note 67,
304, 306, 309, 311, 313, 322, 333, 335-39, 352,
441,448, 453, 464.

253.
254.

To the extent that acquiescence would constitute a breach of its obligations.
Issa, supra note 196, 71.
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Thus, it would seem that there may be an identifiable trend
toward recognizing varying levels of obligation. In particular, it may
be that negative obligations apply whenever a state acts
extraterritorially 255 (at least with respect to intentional human rights
violations, as opposed to indirect consequences), but that the degree
of positive obligations will be dependent upon the type and degree of
control (or power or authority) exercised by the state. This is not
inconsistent with these institutions' general jurisprudence on positive
obligations. Such obligations are limited by a scope of reasonableness
even when applied to a state's conduct within its territory; there is no
reason why application to a state's extraterritorial conduct would not
be bounded similarly by a scope of reasonableness, 256 such that the
adoption of affirmative measures is only required when and to the
extent that the relevant party de jure or de facto enjoys a position of
control that would make the adoption of such measures reasonable.
Ultimately, any such inquiry would be highly fact-sensitive.
This approach would preserve the integrity of the respective
treaties 25 7 and would vindicate the universal nature of human rights,
which is proclaimed in the preambles of all of the human rights
treaties considered in this analysis. At the same time, it would not
place unreasonable burdens on state parties. Due to the very nature
of negative obligations, states would be bound by those obligations
only to the extent they affirmatively acted within the relevant sphere.
Similarly, positive obligations would apply only in circumstances in
which it would be reasonable for the state to take affirmative steps in
light of its level of authority, control, and resources. Thus, where
there is only a limited connection between a state and an individual,
the state would not be required to undertake the same degree of
positive action, if any, to protect that individual's rights as it would if
the individual were subject to a broader degree of control by the state,
such as in situations of territorial occupation.

255.
The phrase "acts extraterritorially" is meant to encompass acts outside the
state's territory, as well as acts within the state's territory that infringe the rights of
those situated outside of the state's territory.
256.
Similar reasoning is implicit in the jurisprudence of human rights
mechanisms finding that the obligation to ensure rights against violations by private
actors is bounded by a scope of reasonableness. For example, in the VelazquezRodriguez case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights noted that this obligation
was not absolute; the standard is one of "due diligence." Velasquez-Rodriguez Case,
supra note 27,
79, 172. The court also recognized that "[i]t is not possible to make a
detailed list of all such measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of
each State Party." Id.
175. In essence, the inquiry under the American Convention
is whether the State Party acting in good faith undertook steps that were reasonable in
the circumstances.
257.
By not "divid[ing] and tailor[ing]" obligations "in accordance with the
particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act in question." Bankovi6, supra note
42, 75.
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Such an approach also preserves a clear differentiation among
such concepts as attribution, responsibility, jurisdiction, and positive
obligations-the recognition of which is essential to the development
of a coherent jurisprudence. This approach does of course contemplate
that the scope of application of these human rights treaties is
potentially worldwide, or in the words of the ECtHR, "wherever in the
2 58
world [an] act may have been committed or its consequences felt.
Yet, by expressly recognizing a variable scope of jurisdiction, with an
attendant variable level of obligation, this approach would not render
"superfluous and devoid of any purpose" the words "within their
jurisdiction," as the court had warned. Thus, for example, all state
parties would be obliged to refrain from summarily executing
individuals anywhere in the world. A state agent's extraterritorial act
of summary execution would be sufficient to bring the victim within
the jurisdiction of the state party to the extent necessary to apply
that state's negative obligation to respect the right to life. However,
the mere extraterritorial presence of a state agent in the same
physical location as an individual would not be sufficient to bring that
individual within the jurisdiction of that state party for the purpose
of applying positive obligations, e.g., the duty to protect that
259
individual's right to life from violation by a third party.
Finally, such an approach is supported by the text of the ICCPR.
Specifically, the structure of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR supports the
notion that negative obligations apply vis-a-vis all individuals
everywhere, whereas positive obligations may have a more limited
scope. As noted above, Article 2 of the ICCPR reads, "Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind." 260 It does no violence to this language to read "to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction" to
modify only the obligation to ensure rights and not the obligation to
respect them. Indeed, the absence of transitive language between "to
respect" and "all individuals" would seem to support this
interpretation. 261 Thus, the provision may reasonably be read to
oblige states to respect all of the rights in the Covenant vis-A-vis all
persons but to ensure them only to those within the state's territory

258.
Id. 75.
259.
This would certainly be more logically consistent than the ECtHR's
approach of variously referring to matters, persons, property, and acts being "within
their jurisdiction," the express language of Article 1 notwithstanding, and of conflating
attribution, responsibility, and jurisdiction in an effort to achieve the same result. Id.
ICCPR, supra note 8.
260.
261.
It could even be argued that this is the most reasonable interpretation of
the text, rendering recourse to the travaux unnecessary.
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obligations subject to
and subject to its jurisdiction, with both of these
262
the proviso "without distinction of any kind.
E. Application in the Context of Armed Conflict, Occupation,and
Peace Operations
It thus appears that states remain bound by human rights law
even when engaged in hostilities far from their home territories. Even
during the invasion phase of an armed conflict, it would seem that a
state would exercise sufficient control over any individuals with
whom its forces come in contact for those individuals to fall within
the scope of beneficiaries of that state's human rights obligations.
This, however, does not mean that the content of those obligations
would be the same as if the individuals in question were within the
home territory of that state. The scope of the obligation, at least in
terms of the level of obligation as explained above, will vary with the
degree of control exercised in the circumstances. Once an individual
is taken into detention by the state, the degree of control over the
individual will clearly have increased. Similarly, if a state's armed
forces effectively occupy a territory, it is likely that the state's
obligations will entail a substantial positive dimension.

262.
The structure of the American Convention on Human Rights even more
readily lends itself to this interpretation. Article 1 of the American Convention
provides that State Parties undertake "to respect the rights and freedoms recognized
herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full
exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination .. " ACHR, supra
note 8, at art. 1. It would appear from the structure of the text that "all persons
subject to their jurisdiction" modifies only the obligation to ensure rights. Id. The text
of the CRC, which provides "States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth
in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination" does not readily lend itself to this interpretation. G.A. Res. 44/25, art.
2(1), U.N. Doc. AJRES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989). Placing the scope language after the
reference to the rights in the Covenant makes it more difficult to find that the
limitation of scope applies only to the obligation to ensure. At the same time, this
language differs from the ICCPR in two respects. First, as with the ACHR and ECtHR,
there is no mention of territory. Second, the CRC refers to "their" jurisdiction, making
it easier to argue that the Convention is applicable to all children within any State
Party's jurisdiction. Of course, the counter argument would be that since jurisdiction is
singular, this refers to each State's respective jurisdiction. Alternatively, one could
argue that this is merely a reference to jurisdiction in the collective sense (i.e., within
their collective jurisdiction). Finally, the establishment of different scopes of
application for negative and positive obligations does not derive support from Article 1
of the European Convention as that treaty uses only the term "secure," as opposed to
subdividing into "respect" and "ensure." Nonetheless, as indicated above, the court has
consistently recognized a distinction between positive obligations and negative
obligations, employing a different analysis to these different types of obligation.
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F. Collective Action
This issue becomes further complicated in the context of
collective action. In such cases, while the collective entity may
exercise control over the individual alleging a human rights violation,
it is unclear whether such an individual may be deemed within the
jurisdiction of any of the individual states contributing personnel or
otherwise participating in the collective entity. In applying a controlbased standard to determine the scope of beneficiaries of states'
obligations under human rights treaties, it is arguable that the
analysis should start from the position of the individual to determine
whether his or her relationship to the relevant authority meets the
control-based standard and then to address separately the question of
attribution of the entity's conduct to a subject of obligations under
263
human rights law.
The Human Rights Committee has determined that obligations
under the ICCPR continue to apply in full in the context of collective
action. In General Comment 31 it stated:
This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control
of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of
the circumstances in which such power or effective control was
obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State
Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement
operation.

264

Note, however, that this statement may go too far. As noted above in
Part III, the issue of attribution must be considered whenever organs
of a state are assigned to peace operations. If armed forces are placed
entirely and exclusively at the disposal of an intergovernmental
organization, their conduct may no longer be attributable to the
sending state.2 65 However, it is arguable that in such circumstances
the troops would no longer be forces of a State Party.
Nonetheless, if it is determined that the contingent is placed at
the disposal of an intergovernmental organization such that the
sending state is not deemed responsible for the contingent's conduct,
this does not mean that there is no subject of international law that

263.
In this context, it is particularly important to distinguish the question of
the scope of beneficiaries from the issue of attribution. It would seem most appropriate
to determine whether the collective entity exercises the necessary degree of control and
then to focus only on the issue of attribution.
264.
Nature of the General Legal Obligations,supra note 13, 10.
265.
The distinction between these questions was recognized in Bankovi6, in
which the ECHR found that it was unnecessary to consider the "alleged several
liability of the respondent States for an act carried out by an international organization
of which they are members" because the court had already concluded that it was "not
satisfied that the applicants and their deceased relatives were capable of coming within
the jurisdiction of the respondent States on account of the extra-territorial act in
question." Bankovi6, supra note 42,
82-83.
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may be held responsible for violations that may be committed. The
U.N., for example, has a large measure of international legal
personality26 6 and can bear responsibility on the international level
for the conduct of its agents. 26 7 In addition, where serious violations
of human rights law overlap with international criminal law, the
individual perpetrators themselves may be held directly responsible
under international law.

V. CONCLUSION

International judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have provided
answers to many of the important legal questions described in the
Introduction to this Article. Nonetheless, there remain significant
gaps that provide ample opportunity for these institutions to further
elaborate on what is required of states in situations of armed conflict
and occupation. It is now clearly established that both human rights
law and humanitarian law are simultaneously applicable in
situations of armed conflict and occupation and that their
relationship is that of a lex generalis to a lex specialis. However,
there is little detailed guidance on what this means in context. Does
it essentially mean that where the norms overlap, the norms of
humanitarian law prevail? If so, does the assertion that human
rights law continues to apply lose much of its legal significance?
The extraterritorial application of human rights law has also
been clearly established such that, in principle, a state's human
rights obligations will continue to apply, even when it is engaged in
hostilities far from its home territory.
However, international
jurisprudence has yet to produce clear criteria for when
extraterritorial application is triggered or clear parameters for
determining the scope of a state's human rights obligations when it
acts abroad.
Nonetheless, the following principles may underlie a general
trend in human rights jurisprudence. The first is that the negative
dimension of human rights obligations, at least with respect to those
rights that are not essentially territorial in the words of the ICJ, will
apply to a state's conduct in relation to all those who are directly

266.
See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
267.
In general, as intergovernmental organizations have no territory, it may be
useful to analogize to situations of extraterritorial application of human rights law.
However, where an intergovernmental organization acts as the government of a
territory (as in, e.g., the U.N. Interim Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor), it
may be more appropriate to analogize to infraterritorial application with respect to
treatment of individuals within that territory. See Cerone, supra note 29, at 42.
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affected by that conduct anywhere in the world. The second principle
is that the positive dimension of these obligations will be based upon
the degree of control exercised by the state, subject to a standard of
reasonableness.

